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ABSTRACT 
After enjoying close ties from 1991-2000, the United States and Russia have seen 
their partnership deteriorate with post-Soviet relations reaching an all-time low in mid-
2008. In principle, the fault for this breakdown of these relations could be traced to Putin, 
Bush, U.S. policy, Russian nationalism, or Russia’s struggle to strengthen its position in 
the international balance of power. The objective is to identify the main causes of 
Russian anti-Americanism through the employment of Kenneth Waltz’s three levels of 
analysis. 
The overall questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: 1) What has caused an 
increase in Russian anti-Americanism in recent years? 2) What historical, political, and 
strategic significance can be attributed to this increased Russian dissatisfaction with the 
United States? The analysis considers possible root causes found at each of the three 
levels of analysis identified in Kenneth Waltz’s framework for studying international 
relations. These three levels concern the individual, the state (and society), and the 
international system. At each level, relevant factors are examined that may have 
contributed to Russian anti-Americanism, the thesis concludes that President Putin and 
his unique background, world outlook, and desire for power have played the most 
significant role. 
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I. RUSSIAN ANTI-AMERICANISM: ORIGINS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis analyzes twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism and the 
historical, political, and strategic relevance of these sentiments. The objective is to 
identify the root causes of this anti-Americanism and to assess its significance for 
Russian-American relations. 
The overall questions that this thesis seeks to answer are: 1) What has caused an 
increase in Russian anti-Americanism in recent years? and 2) What historical, political, 
and strategic significance can be attributed to this increased Russian dissatisfaction with 
the United States? The analysis considers possible root causes found at each of the three 
levels of analysis identified in Kenneth Waltz’s framework for studying international 
relations.1 These three levels concern the individual, the state (and society), and the 
international system. At each level, relevant factors are examined that may have 
contributed to Russian anti-Americanism. 
In accordance with Waltz’s framework, three subsidiary issues are analyzed. 
• First, how and why has President Vladimir Putin’s personality, political mindset, 
and vision of Russia, contributed to the rise of Russian anti-Americanism? 
• Second, how has Russian nationalism contributed to the rise of anti-American 
sentiment? The debate between the intellectual heirs to Slavophiles2 and the 
                                                 
1 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1959). 
2 The Slavophiles were a nineteenth-century group of Russian intellectuals mainly comprised of petty 
nobility, well educated but not considered Europeanized like much of the upper Russian aristocracy. They 
supported the protection of Russian nationalism, strong Slavic heritage, and distinctive culture. They 
represented Russian Orthodoxy, old noble families, and traditional family beliefs. They discounted Western 
ideals, which included liberalism, socialism, and rationalism. Asgtrid S. Tuminez, Russian Nationalism 
Since 1856, Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., 2000), 63. 
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Westernizers,3 and the positions taken by the Russian Christian Orthodoxy are 
factors in the Russian state and society that deserve attention in this regard. 
• Third, how has Russia’s contemporary effort to reestablish its place in the 
international balance of power affected anti-Americanism, given Russia’s 
degraded position during the 1990s and its attempt to close the Russian-American 
power gap and advance Russian political opportunity and ideology? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of analyzing twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism can 
be found in the deterioration of relations between the U.S. and Russia. Putin’s and 
Washington’s policies, Russian nationalism, and Russia’s struggle to strengthen its 
position in the international balance of power have damaged relations between the United 
States and Russia. Although Russia had taken a number of steps forward in the 
development of positive relations with the United States after the fall of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, it appears that President Putin since becoming president in 2000 has continued to 
take the Russian Federation in a direction that closely emulates old Soviet and Russian 
ideology.4  
Because the events of 9/11 still hold significant relevance, it is crucial that the 
United States and Russia establish a closer political partnership.  This partnership is 
necessary because of the continued threat that terrorism presents to the United States, 
Russia, and the international community. It is therefore imperative to take steps to reverse 
Russian anti-Americanism and assist in dissolving Russian hatred and dissatisfaction with 
the United States. Additionally, significant political matters that will continue to directly 
affect Russo-American relations are those regarding Russian nuclear capabilities and 
                                                 
3 The Westernizers constituted a movement that considered Russians during the nineteenth-century as 
illegitimate children that lacked a national identity.  Unlike Slavophiles, Westernizers were never a group; 
it is a term denoting Russian intellectuals who believed that Russia should be more like the West. Unified 
of the greatest leaders of the Westernizer movement was Petr Chaadaev. His beliefs established a group 
that eventually was called Westernizers by the Slavophiles. Westernizers believed that Russia needed to 
look to the West for guidance and national identity, and that Russia must identify with the West if it was to 
be successful. Ibid., 63. 
4 Boris Yeltsin named Putin acting president on 31 December 1999, and Putin won election to the 
office in March 2000. 
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Russia’s SS-X-27 TOPOL Missiles.5   Reducing Russian anti-Americanism is absolutely 
critical if the United States is to have any chance of successfully meeting Russian half 
way on a number of political issues. Most importantly, Washington’s initiative to place 
missile defense systems along Russian borders has become a significant sore spot 
between George W. Bush and Putin and can be expected to remain so between Medvedev 
and Washington’s next president. One may argue that Putin is overreacting.  However, 
what must be considered is whether or not the United States would feel the same if 
Russia were to place a missile defense system along U.S.-Mexican borders and claim it 
was for Russian defensive protection. 
In order to overcome current Russian anti-Americanism, it is important to identify 
the contemporary and historical factors that have contributed to this Russian perception. 
Waltz’s three levels of analysis suggest that the rise in Russian anti-Americanism may be 
attributable to factors at one or all three levels. This research is intended to provide a 
better understanding of the complexity of twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism, 
its root causes, and what (if anything) can be done to reverse the sentiment. While anti-
Americanism is running rampant throughout Russia and has evidently increased since 
President Putin took office in 2000, it can be argued that anti-Americanism is not a 
universal attitude in all geographic parts of Russia or Russian society. 
C. HYPOTHESIS AND THEORY 
The major question analyzed in this thesis is the origin and implications of 
twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism. The hypothesis is that relevant factors are 
present in each of Waltz’s three levels of analysis, the individual, the state and society, 
and the international system. In other words, the root causes include the views of 
President Putin himself, historic and contemporary Russian nationalism, and Russia’s 
vision of its place in the international system.  Key factors at each of the aforementioned 
levels have contributed to the rise in contemporary Russian anti-Americanism. I argue 
that while the foundation of twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism can be 
                                                 
5“New Russian ICBM has Clinton Roots,” Softwar, 7 July 2007, http://www.softwar.net/ss27.html 
(accessed 19 December 2007). 
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attributed to each of the three levels of analysis, the first level, the individual, in my 
opinion may be most responsible for this increased sentiment.  
The thesis examines the theories of offensive and defensive realism and discusses 
whether either of them helps explain Waltz’s third level of analysis and the apparent rise 
of Russian anti-Americanism. Is it possible that both offensive and defensive realism in 
different ways have contributed to a rise in twenty-first century Russian anti-
Americanism? If so, one could argue that both of these theoretical foundations offer some 
additional explanations as to why Russia perceives its international position as weak and 
failing.  
D. BACKGROUND 
Kenneth Waltz’s first level of analysis suggests that it is possible that a root cause 
for an increase in Russian anti-Americanism may reside in the actions of a national leader 
who has significantly influenced national sentiment.6 Kenneth Waltz’s second level of 
analysis discusses the state and society. Increased Russian anti-Americanism may derive 
from historical Russian culture, domestic forces and “ideological movements.”7 Russian 
nationalism can be considered their independent variable, in that if it were not for 
Russian history and nationalist pride, Russian anti-Americanism might not be as 
substantial.8 Russian nationalism has clearly influenced recent Russian behavior.9 
Kenneth Waltz’s third level of analysis argues that state behavior is determined by the 
distribution of power among states. How Russia defines its role in this power struggle can 
be directly related to how it sees itself within the international security community. 
The rising influence of anti-Americanism in Russian society has affected Russian-
American relations and evoked much concern in the United States. Has Russian anti-
Americanism always been present? Or has it only recently emerged in a more marked 
manner with the political maneuvering of President Vladimir Putin? While Putin goes so 
                                                 





far as to compare the proposed U.S. missile shield in Central Europe to the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, he does call President George W. Bush a friend and insists that Bush is working 
with Moscow to better understand Russia’s defense concerns.10 The view that the 
American way was not necessarily bad and that the U.S. perspective of freedom and 
nationalism was acceptable was evident in a Russian poll conducted in 2000. Over 75% 
of Russians interviewed claimed that they would like a greater sense of human and 
individual rights that include freedoms of expression, religion, and media.11 
Peter Baker and Susan Glasser report that while Putin and Saddam Hussein were 
noted allies both economically and politically, when the 2003 war in Iraq was at the point 
of being initiated by the United States, Putin was trying to convince Saddam to give up, 
to retire, and to prevent an international situation that would not only divide trusted allies, 
but also cause a great deal of suffering and destruction.12 Putin, however, realizing that 
Saddam would not bow to U.S. demands sided regretfully with the United States, but also 
informed President George W. Bush that he was making a significant political mistake by 
invading Iraq. 
Over the course of 2004 to 2007, Dr. Sarah Mendelson of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS), in collaboration with Dr. Ted Gerber of the University 
of Wisconsin-Madison, interviewed over 1,800 Russian youth between the ages of 16 and 
29. The study was commissioned by the Levada Analytic Center13 and resulted in a joint 
publication by Mendelson and Gerber titled, “The Putin Generation.”  This report 
examined and presented the findings that over 60% of Russian youth now see  the United 
States as either outright enemies or at a minimum rivals.14 Additionally, their report 
                                                 
10 “Putin Gives Stark Missile Warning,” BBC , 26 October 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7064428.stm (accessed 20 November 2007). 
11 Dale Herspring and James J. Collins, Putin’s Russia, Past Imperfect: Future Uncertain (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 23. 
12 Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin Rising (New York: A Lisa Drew Book/Scribner, 2005), 
215-228. 
13 Sarah E. Mendelson, “The Putin Generation: The political View of Russian Youth,” CSIS, 25 July 




presented that over 70% of Russian youth felt that the United States aggressively tries to 
impose its will on the rest of the world and that the United States is only willing to 
provide aid if it will influence that country’s foreign policy in a very pro-American 
way.15 
1. The Putin Phenomenon 
Putin’s neo-authoritarian leadership style may have contributed to this increased 
sentiment. Upon Putin’s successful election in 2000, NATO, and President Bill Clinton 
warmly accepted this young, vibrant Russian as not only Russia’s new leader but 
potentially the gateway to improving Russian-American relations.16 During a meeting in 
2001, President George W. Bush stated that “I looked the man in the eye. I was able to 
get a sense of his soul.”17 This led observers to believe that political relations between 
George W. Bush and Putin would be positive. However, Eric Shiraev and Vladislav 
Zubok argue that Putin in many ways is just like Stalin. They are cold, emotionless, 
strong willed, methodical leaders and are considered political “strong men.”18 Russia’s 
strong sense of historical and contemporary nationalism, coupled with Putin’s sense of 
Soviet pride and KGB grooming, seem to have spilled over politically into twenty-first 
century Russian anti-Americanism. 
Dale Herspring and James Collins agree that while Russia does seem to strive for 
successful relations with the United States, the Russians do not believe that they are taken 
seriously; and this forces a very pragmatic Putin to attempt “strong arming” the United 
States.19 Putin seems to seize any opportunity to advance what he sees as Russian 
political interests. Putin masterfully wielded the 9/11 attacks to provide a media 
                                                 
15 Sarah E. Mendelson, “The Putin Generation: The political View of Russian Youth,” CSIS, 25 July 
2007, http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_experts/task,view/id,89/ (accessed 11 January 
2008). 
16 Eric Shiraev and Vladislav Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia: From Stalin to Putin (New York: 
Palgrave, 2000), 139. 
17 “Bush and Putin: Best of Friends,” BBC , 6 June 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1392791.stm (accessed 14 March 2008). 
18 Shiraev and  Zubok, Anti-Americanism in Russia, 12.  
19 Herspring and Collins, Putin’s Russia, 233. 
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opportunity for Russia to demonstrate its interest in improved relations with the United 
States. Putin was the first to call President Bush, offering his condolences and the 
Russian government’s help.20 
2. Russian Nationalism 
Russian anti-Westernism is not new.  It has strong roots in the Slavophilist 
movement during the early nineteenth-century.21 Astrid Tuminez notes that proponents of 
this movement held that Western society was soulless, self-centered, and shallow.22 
Slavophiles argued that U.S. culture and society did not live in harmony and faith with 
each other.23 In Other words, Americans did not respect each, share a common religion, 
and did not get along very well. Some Russians during this period were very anti-
American and felt that Russia possessed a romantic nationalist culture that should be 
valued and remain distinctive and organic.24 
Upon President Putin’s successful transition from Russian prime minister to RF 
president, he made it clear that “One should not forget that NATO and Europe is not the 
same thing. Russia belongs to European culture, but does not share the culture of 
NATO.”25 Putin extended his comments to the West and indicated that he did not trust 
the United States or its policy. 
Dmitrii Likhachev holds that Russia has an exceptional degree of national pride 
and that Russia in its post-Soviet phase must protect its rich culture and history.26 For 
these reasons, Russians have been programmed to dislike the U.S. based partially on 
strong Russian culture, pride, and a sense of romantic nationalism.27 Richard Dobson 
interviewed many Russians and found that many displayed anxiety over American 
                                                 
20 Herspring and Collins, Putin’s Russia, 233. 
21 Tuminez, Russian Nationalism Since 1856, 265. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., 64. 
24 Tuminez, Russian Nationalism Since 1856, 63.. 
25 Ibid., 127.  
26 Ibid., 274. 
27 Ibid., 265. 
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policies and the U.S. way of life.28 Many of the interviewees asserted that Americans 
lacked spirituality and that the United States was a growing pool of crime, inadequate 
social protection, and emptiness.29  So what does this mean? While Russians do not 
necessarily want to become westernized, some do share a common view that things are 
not so bad in the United States.  Russians are interested in exploring moderate levels of 
freedom, equality, and political opportunity, but do not wish to lose their sense of 
Russian pride in the process.   
The literature at hand supports the argument that Russians have expressed and 
continue to manifest anti-American sentiments. Richard Dobson pointed out over 10 
years ago that some Russians did wish to work with the United States in an effort to 
better social, economic, and political conditions.30 Their only stipulation was they did not 
want to lose equality with the West, simply to adhere to a more positive relationship with 
Americans. Over 10 years ago, many Russians felt that America was trying to suppress 
Russia, weaken it, reduce Russia’s role in the international system, and solidify 
America’s own position as a dominant power.31 According to one Stavropol worker, “All 
troubles come from the West, we lack all independence.”32 
3. International Balance of Power 
Hedley Bull notes that a stable balance of power requires three basic 
foundations.33 First, a balance of power is necessary throughout the entire international 
community so that there cannot be a quest for universal empires.34 Russians contend that 
the United States is trying to dictate to them how they should run their government. Putin 
argues that Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush both attempted to make Russia 
                                                 
28 Richard B. Dobson: Russia’s Future: Perspectives of Young Russians: 1994-1995, R-1-95, 
September 1995, 9. 
29 Dobson: Russia’s Future, 9. 
30 Dobson: Russia’s Future, 9. 
31 Dobson: Russia’s Future, 20. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 102. 
34 Ibid. 
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subservient to the United States and decrease Russia’s power internationally. Second, 
Bull states that the balance of power develops a form of checks and balances that 
prevents one state from being able to absorb another.35 It can be argued that since Putin’s 
election to the presidency in 2000, Russian sentiment has been that the United States has 
been trying to improve political relations with Russia. But, the literature also states that 
Russian anti-Americanism seems to be at its highest level in years.36 
The last foundation that Bull identifies is that in order for a balance of power to 
exist there must be international order in diplomacy, war, and power management among 
major international actors, notably the United States and Russia. While the United States 
is interested in missile defense and NATO expansion, Moscow seems to welcome U.S. 
offers with closed arms. Arguably Moscow’s concerns about U.S. missile defense are not 
unfounded. Would Washington welcome a reverse initiative by Russia if they were to 
place missile defense systems in Cuba or Mexico? It is highly unlikely. It would seem 
that Putin is attempting to redress the unequal balance of power and to regain at least 
some of the influence of Soviet times. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The basic analytical approach be used in this thesis will be a combination of the 
historical and analytical methods. There is an exceptional amount of literature on Russian 
anti-Americanism both online and on bookshelves. A variety of Russian and U.S. 
sources, both primary and secondary, are examined to test the aforementioned 
hypotheses. While President Putin has curtailed much of what the domestic media is 
allowed to write and how it is allowed to portray his government, there are suitable 
Russian sources available to study and analyze. Not all authors agree on the current state 
of Russian anti-Americanism. Some maintain that it is more historical in nature, while 
others argue that President Putin is the main factor promoting the reemergence of the 
“Iron Curtain.” 
                                                 
35 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2000), 102. 
36  Dobson, Russia’s Future 9. 
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F. ROADMAP 
Chapter II analyzes President Vladimir Putin in relation to Waltz’s first level of 
analysis, the individual, and how Putin’s vision of Russia may have contributed to 
increased twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism. This chapter also analyzes 
Putin’s youth, education, worldview, KGB career, position as prime minister, and 
eventual rise to the presidency of the Russian Federation. Putin’s relationships with 
Presidents Bill Clinton, G.H.W. Bush, and G.W. Bush will also be analyzed, as well how 
his political approach slowly changed during each of their administrations. Additionally 
examined will be why Putin appears to hold the United States with such disdain, thereby 
promoting Russian anti-Americanism. 
Chapter III addresses Russian nationalism and Waltz’s second level of analysis: 
state and society. How this has contributed to the rise in Russian anti-Americanism can 
be associated with the positions taken traditionally by the Russian Orthodox Church and 
the Slavophiles. This level argues that because of the social psychology these groups 
foster, it is not surprising that Russians are pre-disposed to dislike recent American 
policies and attitudes. This provides a foundation to approach the perception of how a 
state observes its international counterparts. Additionally, how has social rallying 
contributed to the rise in anti-American sentiment? Could it be associated with Russian 
nationalism, social and state groupings? As Russians appear content with the efforts 
made by “Nashe,” a social movement that intends to bring back old Soviet ways, it 
appears that Russians are lowering a new iron curtain. It also appears that President Putin 
is rallying nationalism and the state and social personality of twenty-first century Russia, 
which seems go hand-in-hand with increased anti-Americanism. 
Chapter IV considers strategic balancing, Russian realism in combination with 
internal and external Russian political agendas, and leadership interpretations of Russia’s 
international position. Waltz’s third level analyzes the international system, and this 
relates to Russia’s reaction to an unequal distribution of power in relation to the West. 
How Russia sees this inequality with the United States may have led to Russia’s 
impression that it is strategically discriminated against and that the international balance 
of power favors the U.S.  Russia’s self-perceived weakness and unequal treatment could 
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be argued as a premise for the rise in twenty-first century anti-Americanism currently 
being examined. This has appeared to regard to Russia’s struggle against U.S. missile 
defense, its deterrence concerns, and its strategic balancing against the United States and 
matters of defensive realism as Russia attempts to regain some of the power and 
influence that it exercised in Soviet times, could it be argued that Moscow is retreating to 
a more Darwinian state of affairs and championing the survival of the fittest as suggested 
by offensive realism. It may be concluded that as Russia continues to perceive its 
declining role in the balance of international power as unfair and threatened, it has begun 
to address problems of military readiness, strategic inferiority, and power projection 
capabilities.  As it struggles with its own new strategic identity and position in the 
international balance of power, it has become more aggressive, at least in the short term. 
Chapter V analyzes all three levels of analysis and determines which image is 
most responsible for the increased sense of Russian anti-Americanism. Discussed is the 
current state of declining twenty-first century Russo-American relations and how better 
policy initiatives may improve these relations in the areas of the Jackson-Vanik 
Amendment, the CFE Treaty, and NATO enlargement. Additionally reviewed is Russia’s 
future with Medvedev as president, and Putin as prime minister, and what Washington 
will need to do to improve these relations and reduce Russian fears of U.S. dominance. 
Moreover, how will the next president affect Russo-American relations and how might 
Russia see each of the choices as the candidates prepare for the November elections? 
Lastly, is Medvedev being groomed as the next Putin or will he find the tenacity to pave 
his own way? Putin’s influence over Medvedev will be addressed and how Putin may be 
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II. THE PUTIN PHENOMENON 
A.  FIRST LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
Chapter II examines Kenneth Waltz’s first level of analysis, the individual, and 
considers how President Vladimir Putin’s personality, political mindset, and vision of 
Russia may have contributed to the rise of twenty-first Century Russian anti-
Americanism. Have his relations with the United States and NATO been well received by 
elite and mass public audiences in Russia? Is Putin working a propaganda machine and 
seeking to mold Russian views of Americans?  His purpose for this may be based on his 
own Communist education and distrust in the United States, as well as a desire to build 
his own personal popularity.    
This chapter will provide evidence that Putin’s behavior has become misdirected, 
aggressive, and politically defiant, which has contributed to Russia’s less-than-favorable 
impression of the United States.37 The recent Georgian conflict is a good example of this. 
Putin actually blamed the United States for the crisis, claiming that Washington was 
trying to make Russia look bad in the eyes of the international community.38 
Furthermore, Putin has changed his mind regarding NATO more times than not.39 First, 
he expressed an interest, claiming Russia would consider joining. The he contradicts 
himself and states that NATO lacks qualities worthy of Russian consideration. This 
makes his political position frequently hard to read confusing U.S. officials.   
Hans Morgenthau claims that “The test of political success is the degree to which 
one is able to maintain, to increase, or to demonstrate one’s power over others.”40 
Morgenthau’s perspective may help explain Putin’s apparent desire to control the image 
of the United States and Russia’s interactions with Washington. He’s uses the U.S. 
position on domestic and political positions and to rally Russian anti-Americanism. 
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Putin’s opinion of the United States does not seem to be based on factual information. 
Granted, it can be argued that the United States has given Putin grounds to be upset. 
Putin’s opinions may instead be founded on Russia’s and his own Communist 
background. Putin politically shoot from the hip. He is intelligent but his behavior leaves 
Washington wondering what his motives are.  
Francis Bacon states “the human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily 
supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things that it really finds.”41 This is 
attributable to Putin in that he appears to strive for the development of a greater sense of 
equality with the United States. One could argue that Putin realizes this cannot be 
accomplished since the United States is realistically the only true superpower but still 
Putin aggressively attacks the U.S. and its policy agenda. 
Robert Jervis argues that leaders can become uncomfortable trying to address a 
situation that cannot be rationally, intellectually, or pragmatically, in Putin’s case, 
explained.42 The result can be psychological discomfort, insecurity, and intellectual 
dissatisfaction.43 Putin’s Communist upbringing may not allow him to readily understand 
the complexity of the United States without a predisposed set of twentieth-century biases. 
Everything the United States does is perceived by Putin as an attempt to make Russia a 
little brother to the United States. Moscow is no longer experiencing Cold War 
aggressions, but it seems to be suffering from a Cold War mentality that continues to 
foster a negative perception.  
1. Perceptions and Misperceptions 
Putin emulates Soviet era distrust and sees things only as he wishes. His Soviet 
background predisposes him to distrust the United States and he views U.S. policy as 
manipulative and dishonest. This has clouded Putin’s ability to reasonably assess policies 
and motives.  He is not interested in Russia serving as a lapdog to the United States and 
                                                 
41 Quoted in Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 319. 
42 Waltz, Man, the State, and War, 319.. 
43 Ibid. 
  15
clearly will not stand for it.44 To a degree, the United States is a perfect model of 
Morgenthau’s definition of political success, and Russia is not. Putin aggressively and 
publicly expresses his admiration for a fallen Soviet Union. He longs to recapture its 
political power and displays a sense of embracing its glorious past.45   
When Putin inherited the political reins of Russia, he accepted the huge task of 
bringing Russia into the twenty-first century politically and socially. His personality is 
calculating, his decisions stern and forthright, and his emotions, at times, skillfully 
hidden. His political influence has the potential to yield a new and stronger Russian 
infrastructure of political stability and domestic hope for a better Russia. However, his 
decisions regarding how he addresses and contends with Washington appear to be 
sending Russia steamrolling back to old Soviet ways. Because Putin is Communist in 
nature, he seeks to strengthen Russia’s perception of external power. Waltz and 
Morgenthau offer that men are “born seekers of power.”46 Power can offer a leader 
“means to an end” and, in other instances, power is just the instrument towards men 
gaining the control they desire.47 Putin was born into an era of USSR vs. U.S. 
dominance, and therefore is physiologically programmed to recreate a nostalgic image of 
the Soviet Union. Therefore, he seems to be copying much of its instinctive opposition to 
U.S. policies and initiatives. 
2. Personal Experiences 
Jervis states that one’s behavior is attributable to one’s past and personal 
experiences.48 How Putin makes decisions can be attributed to his own personal 
experiences during his childhood, his time at Leningrad State University (LGU), and 
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more importantly, his career in the KGB. Jervis theorizes that a number of variables are 
attributable to how to one makes decisions and behaves politically. 
There are four variables that influence the degree to which an event affects 
later perceptual predispositions are whether or not the person experienced 
the event firsthand, whether it occurred early in his adult life or career, 
whether it had important consequences for him or his nation, and whether 
he is familiar with a range of international events that facilitate alternative 
perceptions. We can make only two observations about the relative 
importance of these variables and the way they interact. First, when 
several of the variables are positive, the event will have especially great 
salience. But it would be attempting too much precision to say whether the 
impact of the variables is additive or multiplicative. Second, events that 
are terribly important for a nation can have so great an impact that the 
perceptual predispositions of those who did not participate in the making 
of the policy will be affected almost as much as those who did. 49 
It is important to reflect on the last part of Jervis’s statement in that past events of 
great importance to a nation can subconsciously affect the individual making that nation’s 
decisions. Clearly, Putin is an example of this. His strong Soviet background may lead 
him to postulate Washington’s desire to control Russia, thereby driving Putin to 
subconsciously attack the United States and its Russian policy. Jervis also offers for 
consideration that “a person who has been bitten by a snake will be predisposed to seeing 
ambiguous figures as snakes.”50 In the instance, the United States can be perceived as the 
snake and Putin the victim. He continues this sentiment with the person who has been 
bitten with take excessive measures to prevent future bites.51 This strongly resembles 
Putin’s behavior towards the United States. The Soviets may have felt the U.S. bit them 
during the Cold War. Since Putin is a product of this time, his threats that Russia will not 
become subservient to the United States seem reasonably logical.   
As Jervis claims, personal experiences are a significant platform for one’s 
behavior and how leaders conduct themselves in the presence of another nation’s policies 
and principal actors. One could contend that Putin sees the United States as an essential 
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factor in the recent submission of Russia politically. Jervis theorizes that “a person’s most 
fundamental orientations, his feelings, and his ability to influence his environment and 
possibly his nation, whether hostile or benign originate during his childhood.”52 Putin 
spent his youth saturated by g Soviet propaganda. Now as an adult, Putin perspectives 
can be seen as a reflection of these Stalinist values. 
Benedict Spinoza stated that to “understand or explain human behavior, you need 
to reference psychological factors.”53 This, one can argue, reflects on Putin’s past. To 
understand Putin and why he seems transparently anti-American, we need to examine his 
psychological makeup. He was born and raised during a very difficult time in the USSR 
when the United States was not perceived as friend but more as a foe. 
B. VLADIMIR THE PERSON 
Putin’s transformation and quick rise to political stardom fell unexpectedly into 
the hands of a man once defined as socially insecure, skinny, and hardnosed.54 So what 
could be expected of Putin? He certainly never imagined he would become president of 
Russia. At best he aspired to become a KGB officer. He had no idea what the future 
would hold for him, but became the perfect example of Russia’s American dream, rising 
up from a poverty-stricken youth surrounded by crime and corruption. Subconsciously 
driven by a strong Soviet upbringing, Putin has arguably transformed himself into a 
Russian post-Soviet tsar. He is intelligent, speaks with a golden tongue, albeit with a 
penchant for crude humor, and seems to use his political influence as a sounding board in 
the promotion of Russian anti-American. 
1. Early Years 
Putin was not born to a family of riches, education, influence or power. Small, 
and scrawny in stature, Putin was full of youthful aggression but presumed limited 
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potential. His childhood was rooted in the problems of a very poor USSR, a shoddy 
boyhood home, and a hallway shared with rats.55 Nurtured on common Communist 
principles,  
Putin was born in Leningrad on October 7, 1952. He would eventually reach only 
5 feet 6 inches, his features chiseled, emotions void of sympathy or charisma, and 
mannerisms punctuated only by limited episodes of laughter or softness. His penetrating 
steely blue eyes are very characteristic of a true Russian.  
His grandfather, Spiridon Putin, was the personal cook for both Lenin and Stalin, 
and a survivor of a brutal Soviet era.56 His parents were of common Soviet virtue, simple 
and ordinary. Putin’s father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, was stern, void of emotion, 
and was considered a very mean-looking man.57 Putin’s fourth-grade teacher, Vera 
Dmitrievna Gurevich, commented that Putin’s father raised him with a heavy hand.58 
There were no hugs, kisses, or affection in the Putin household. Putin’s father appeared to 
be kindhearted but emotionally, everything was kept inside.59 Putin would take after his 
father. Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin served in the Soviet Navy as a submariner and 
eventually as a soldier in the demolitions battalion of the NKVD during World War II.60 
After being injured, his father left the service and became a Communist party member 
and factory worker.61 Putin’s mother, Maria Ivanovna Putina, was a factory worker, a 
romantic and devout Orthodox. She could be considered the catalyst behind instilling 
gentleness in Putin as a father and husband.  
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As a child, Putin was a rough, ill-mannered, troublemaker submersed in a 
concrete jungle that forced him to become aggressive and self-reliant.62 But his teacher 
Gurevich felt that although Putin was rough around the edges, he was generally a good 
person. Putin recalls not starting school until he was 8 years old, and to this day, 
remembers himself as a very average student, aggressive and defiant towards his 
teachers.63 Gurevich notes that Putin would not forgive those who betrayed him.64 This 
may offer insight into Putin’s behavior and his later decision to defy U.S. policies after 
feeling ignored and double-crossed by the United States over a series of issues.  
2. Leningrad State University (LGU) 
It is important to consider that while at LGU, Putin’s interest went beyond the 
realm of his studies. He became highly interested in the Communist Party of the USSR, 
and eventually became a member, until the party was dissolved in 1991.65 It is necessary 
to reflect on Putin’s affiliation with the Communist Party. Putin not only supported the 
Communist Party, he also only elected to dissolve his membership when he was forced to 
do so. Notably one could argue that Putin only entertains twenty-first century relations 
with the U.S. because he feels obligated to do so through U.S. pressure. What also should 
be considered is that LGU was a theoretical stronghold of anti-Americanism in the 1970s 
and 1980s.66 Most of Putin’s professors were strong advocates of the Communist system, 
views that could have logically been translated to Putin.67  
3. KGB Officer and Duties Abroad 
Propelled by aspirations of becoming a high-ranking KGB officer and protector of 
the Soviet Union, Putin became infatuated with the KGB at a very young age. He fell in 
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love with the movie Sword and Shield, and the seemingly romantic idea of becoming a 
KGB intelligence officer.68 Putin eventually changed his impression of the romanticisms 
of the service. According to one account, “the KBG was not as he expected and certainly 
was not glamorous or as fancy as he once thought.”69  
During Putin’s ninth-grade year, he began to give serious consideration to joining 
the KGB.70 He went to the KGB Directorate and approached a officer asking if he could 
join.71 To his dismay, the agent told him that the KGB did not accept volunteers and that 
he had to be selected for membership.72 More importantly, the agent told Putin he needed 
to attend university first and, if the KGB was interested, it would find him. This did not 
discourage Putin. His desire to become a KGB member would only propel him to work 
harder and become more focused. In 1975, Putin successfully graduated from LGU with 
a degree in law.73 The culmination of Putin’s dream and hard work was realized when 
upon graduation from LGU, he successfully entered the KGB.74 Putin later recalled that 
the KGB targeted him for recruitment even before he graduated from LGU.75 “You 
know, I even wanted it,” he said of joining the KGB.76 “I was driven by high motives. I 
thought I would be able to use my skills to the best for society.”77 
In 1978, he completed his training as a KGB Intelligence Specialist78 and after 
spying on foreigners for the First Department of Leningrad, Putin was called back to 
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attend elite foreign intelligence training institute until 1983.79 At the age of 32 and upon 
completion of his training, Putin served abroad in Dresden, Germany, for five years. He 
found himself in Dresden during a time when East Germany was of considerable interest 
to Moscow.80 The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was the location of 
approximately 380,000 Soviet troops, as well as a deployment of SS-20 mobile nuclear-
tipped missiles.81 During his time in East Germany he would become quite well versed in 
German, and gain an appreciation for German culture.82 This could be considered the 
start of Putin’s political career, even if he was unaware of it. 
To this day, Putin would consider his time in Dresden as highly beneficial, but 
that the position he held to be very minor.83 Interestingly, Communist paranoia and the 
extreme confidentiality of KGB duties limited available information regarding how 
agents were tasked. For this reason, Putin’s duties while in Dresden cannot be accurately 
discussed, and Putin seems unwilling to do so. Following the collapse of the East German 
regime, Putin was ordered back to the USSR, and eventually returned to Leningrad.84 In 
June of 1990, he accepted a position with the International Affairs section of LGU, 
reporting to Vice-Rector Yuri Molchanov.85 In his new position, Putin became 
reacquainted with a long-time friend and colleague Anatoly Sobchak, then mayor of 
Leningrad.86 Sobchak had served as an assistant professor during Putin’s university years 
and became a very good friend to Putin.87 On August 20, 1991, Putin officially resigned 
from the State Security Services during the KGB-supported abortive ousting of President 
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Mikhail Gorbachev.88  Putin had spent 16 years as an agent, and in the end, was 
considered an average agent, nothing spectacular, and certainly not someone expected to 
become Russia’s next president. After a number of attempts, Putin successfully 
resigned.89Putin’s resume in the KGB may provide insight into his behavior toward the 
U.S. in that in one instance he may approve of Washington and the United States but on 
the other hand, may actually find significant suspicion in U.S. policy.90  
4. St. Petersburg 
From 1994 to 1996, Putin would serve as deputy mayor of St. Petersburg under 
Sobchak. In this capacity, Putin became very influential, becoming involved in every 
aspect of running St. Petersburg. Putin became a principal actor in the alleged corruption 
that would define its municipal government. During his tenure as deputy mayor, Putin’s 
office fell under criticism for unethical and illegal contract activity.91 It was alleged that 
he provided preferential treatment to a group of companies that had agreed to import food 
to Russia in return for contracts that would exceed $92 million.92 Although avidly 
denying the changes, Putin would get caught personally signing an oil contract in excess 
of $32 million.93 Marina Salye, a local St. Petersburg’s lawyer, recommended Putin’s 
dismissal. She would claim that Putin’s behavior was characterized by “incompetence 
bordering on lack of conscientiousness, and that he presented unprecedented negligence 
and irresponsibility in his duties as deputy mayor.”94 Even after the commission led by 
Marina Salye recommended Putin’s dismissal, and presented convincing proof, Sobchak 
refused to dismiss Putin.95 
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5. The Yeltsin Transition 
Boris Yeltsin always had a soft spot for placing those into office that he 
considered Siloviki.96 Siloviki were officials with experience in the “power ministries,” 
such as the army, police, and secret services, and Putin fell perfectly into this category.97 
Yeltsin wanted to surround himself with those who had been part of a strong Soviet 
Union and were part of youth movements, or were young lawyers and economists. He 
liked Putin but recalled that during his first encounter he noticed that Putin seemed 
emotionally withdrawn and lacked a certain sense of personal contact. Yeltsin furthered 
his sentiment of Putin by claiming that Putin’s “calmness scared him and made him very 
cautious.”98 Yeltsin would later state he came to realize it was just Putin’s “ingrained 
nature” to behave in such a way.99 
Throughout Putin’s career under Yeltsin, he would continually gain the interest 
and support of Yeltsin. After serving just one year in Moscow, he had impressed Yeltsin 
so much that he was promoted to director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian 
Federation (FSB).100 This position went beyond Putin’s expectations. His performance 
had been average at best during his career with the KGB, and he never could have 
imaged that he would lead the organization that started his career almost 20 years earlier. 
On 26 December 1999 Yeltsin meet with Putin at his home. He informed Putin 
that on the 31st, he would be stepping down and identified Putin as his replacement. 
Whereas most people would find great excitement in the realization they were about to 
enter into such a grand office, Putin thought differently. He would express to Yeltsin that 
he was not ready and quite frankly did not want the job.101 Putin claimed the presidency 
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offered a rather “difficult destiny,” and one he was not sure he could pull off.102 In an 
effort to pacify Putin’s concerns, Yeltsin would claim that Russia was ready for a new 
leader, a man who could take it to another level. He claimed Russia was ready for the 
“Putin era.”103 This man who had just been named prime minister in August of 1999 was 
now on the cusp of running the world’s largest country. Until this point, Putin was more 
concerned with just keeping his job. As it had been publically reported, Yeltsin had 
already gone through five prime ministers in 17, months leaving Putin to wonder how 
secure his job was.104 Putin would state that Yeltsin’s move was, “totally unexpected and 
still to this day amazes him.”105 
Yeltsin relinquished the presidency on New Year’s Eve, 1999, naming Putin as 
his successor.106 In the face of public tears and discontent in the announcement of his 
resignation, Yeltsin begged for Russians to forgive him. He wanted them to warmly 
welcome Putin as their interim president. As Yeltsin left office, he told Putin “take care 
of Russia.”107 The United States had come to know Yeltsin as a drunkard and politically 
inept leader. What they were about to face in Putin would be completely different. To 
thank Yeltsin, Putin’s first act as president would be to exonerate Yeltsin and his family 
from future criminal prosecution over his various misdeeds in office.108 
6. Russia’s Twenty-First Century President 
Vladimir Putin’s rise to the presidency on 31 December 1999 can be depicted as 
the beginning of a new Russia. Political expectations of Putin were substantial. He found 
himself tasked not only with transforming the Soviet Union, but more dauntingly, 
resurrecting a fractured Russia and a dismal Russian self image. He ultimately addressed 
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Russia’s place internationally, and created an administration that developed and repaired 
Russia’s failing social and economic status. Seemingly, Putin became driven to either 
solidify better relations with the United States, or knock them off their self-appointed 
pedestal of international superiority. Putin initially cooperated with the United States on a 
number of treaty issues where Yeltsin had failed (START II and the CTBT) but it is 
debatable whether Putin’s true agenda was so flexible.  
His actions, words, and relations with the United States became the catalyst of 
what could be considered the foundation of Russo-American relations. So if Putin was so 
driven to establish better Russo-American relations, what happened? Why would Putin 
later strive to create hostile relations between Russia and the United States? Putin could 
be compared with Stalin in very general terms. Both Stalin and Putin desired a strong 
Russian hierarchy, capable of influencing and dominating border states and controlling 
their own internal sovereignty. This point holds great importance in the development of 
Putin as a strong Russian leader and his influence on future relations with Washington. 
He may have seen the United States as progressively making Russia subservient to 
Washington and thereby found it necessary to strike back with verbal aggression and 
transparent threats.   
As Putin entered office, he was committed to following Russia’s constitutional 
laws and political foundations. Unfortunately, it would appear that as president, he has 
incorporated his own interpolations of the constitution, which many would consider 
flawed and brutally unethical. Putin implies that following the rules is an absolute, and 
that all great leaders must abide and appreciate basic political foundations that should 
never be compromised.109 The problem with this form of Putin’s politics is that he does 
not follow his own words and readily jails or exiles members of the media, businessmen, 
or politicians who do not follow his agenda. An example of this would be the 
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Khodorkovskiy110 incarceration or the highly publicized assassination of Alexander 
Litvinenko under dubious circumstances involving radioactive materials.111 
Putin considers himself a statesman among statesmen and believes that his two 
terms as President have yielded nothing but absolute success both in Russia and within 
the international community.112 When Putin was asked whom he respects as strong 
political leaders, Putin discusses his admiration for Charles De Gaulle and Ludwig 
Erhard.113  Both were pragmatic and authoritarian leaders and both were considered to 
have accomplished great political initiatives for France and Germany. Just as they 
recreated and revitalized their countries, Putin wants to believe that he is Russia’s moral 
compass and a good example of what it means to be Russian.114 One could easily argue 
that in considering Putin’s background, psychological make-up, and policy directives, he 
may believe that he can return Russia to times of a Soviet greatness. This is a daunting 
task considering over half of the Soviet Union’s population now lives in independent 
countries and Russia has lost one-forth of its former terrority.  
Similar to Stalin, Putin is not a trusting leader. Whether this originates from his 
time as a KGB officer or his political tenure in St. Petersburg or not, this quality clearly 
influences Putin’s every political decision.115 Putin claims that in order to be taken 
seriously, one must exude a sense of confidence and control.116 This could be the premise 
behind why Putin tends to be very crude and aggressive in the language he uses. While 
some of his inherent distrust could be simply founded in Communist history, it is clear he 
does possess personal animosity and distrust towards the United States. During Russia’s 
December 2007 elections, Russia fell under international controversy and disapproval 
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from the U.S. for its electoral process. Reportedly, the United States did not approve of 
the Russian refusal to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
request for full access to its elections or the opportunity to be present for purposes of 
monitoring. Putin struck back by stating that the OCSE’s decision to boycott the elections 
“was done on the recommendation of the U.S. State Department, and we will take this 
into account in our intergovernmental relations with that country.”117 Putin furthered his 
comments by stating that “Actions like this will not foil elections in Russia, they will fail 
to attain this goal.”118 By this, one could argue, that Putin saw himself as preventing the 
United States and the OSCE from controlling or influencing Russia’s state sovereignty.  
Putin validates Russian anti-Americanism insinuating that the United States is out 
to get Russia. With this in mind, Russians would be more likely to believe that the United 
States is trying to subvert Russia.” Sarah Mendelson reports that Putin has become vocal 
in his accusations against the United States and compares Washington to Germany’s 
Third Reich in its pursuit of world dominance.119 As president, Putin felt perhaps 
betrayed by disagreements over U.S. missile defense, space initiatives, the ABM Treaty, 
and the CFE Treaty. Arguably, these disputes could serve as the premise for Putin 
internally convincing himself that the United States was the enemy, and that Russians 
must be aware of this. Moreover, one might hypothesize that Putin entered office with an 
open mind and that these events and disagreements, contributed to his regression to 
Soviet-style anti-American thinking. But it did not seem to take much pushing, given 
Putin’s predilections. 
C. PUTIN AND BUSH  
Relations between the United States and Russia haven’t always been frosty. There 
were times during the eighteenth and nineteenth-centuries when diplomatic relations were 
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quite good. Spearheaded by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his ambassadorial pact 
with the Russians in 1933, the United States and Russia also managed to get along and 
allied together to fight Nazi Germany.120 If history repeats itself, we could see a shifting 
in the political winds between Washington and Moscow, which may have originated with 
Putin and his aggressive verbal rhetoric and could gravitate to Medvedev and more 
positive relations over the coming years. U.S. presidents have always found it necessary 
to entertain the Russian psyche in an effort to reassure Moscow that we are not out to 
suppress their political, social, and economic agendas. But personalities matter, whether 
through Roosevelt’s diplomatic initiative, Kennedy’s temperance in the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, Nixon’s offer to curtail the nuclear arms race, or Reagan’s desire to end the Cold 
War,  the United States appears to be continually working towards keeping the peace 
with Moscow.121 George Kisker noted: 
That to realize peace, one must seek to understand the minds of men; only 
when we deal with their “motives” do we approach the “fundamental 
levels of the problem.”122 
Prior to George W. Bush entering office, Putin began looking forward to his 
arrival and began to politically court the prospective Bush cabinet.123 This was based on 
comments by George Bush Sr. to Russian officials during a trip to Russia that his son, 
George Bush Jr., would become the next U.S. president.124 One could argue that Moscow 
and Washington with an earlier Bush as president had enjoyed positive Russo-American 
relations. It had been rumored that towards the end of the Clinton-Putin era, Putin was 
growing tired of Clinton and looked forward to another Bush in office.125  
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With the successful election of George W. Bush, and Putin’s respect for the Bush 
family, Moscow expected prosperous relations to develop in Washington. Putin perceived 
Bush as pragmatic, just as he saw himself, and expected Washington and Russia to see 
eye-to-eye on many issues. As Bush entered office, he tried to cement positive relations 
with Putin by claiming he respected Putin, and that he “saw the soul of a good man.”126 
He would also comment that:  
We’re dealing with a lot history and a lot of suspicion...the President and I 
will try to work through these for our common good. And I’m hopeful we 
can have some breakthroughs.127  
It seemed that at times, Bush and Putin were on the same political page. However, 
Putin would ultimately, disagree with many of Bush’s initiatives. Putin may have felt the 
United States betrayed Russia with its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the Jackson-
Vanik misunderstanding, and the failure of the United States to back Russia on the CFE 
Treaty. 
Whether Russia is right or wrong is irrelevant. Washington must realize a better 
understanding of Russia’s internal struggles before they can properly address twenty-first 
century Russo-American relations.  
1. September 11, 2001 
Following the September 11 attacks, Putin and George W. Bush Russia began to 
reshape their political relations in an effort to combat terrorism together. Putin was quick 
to call Bush and relay his condolences and support to the United States. This politically 
savvy move by Putin would forge a new and apparent friendship between the United 
States and Russia in the fight against terrorism. With a new Russo-American partnership 
in place, the United States would further assist Russia economically. Putin hoped this 
newly forged relationship with Washington would assist in developing Russia 
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economically and further integration politically with the United States.128 He also hoped 
this new relationship would stop the United States from its continual criticism of Russia 
and its actions in Chechnya.  
In May of 2002, while both G.W. Bush and Putin were celebrating the Treaty of 
Moscow, both presidents came to verbal blows. Putin became very upset in that he had 
hoped the Treaty of Moscow would help develop of a new strategic relationship with 
Bush. He felt double crossed at the concept of a Bush-imposed steel tariff. Putin would 
rebut Bush’s tariff with aggressively stating how poor the poultry was that the U.S. sent 
to Russia. He claimed the “U.S. was sending poor chicken legs to Russia on purpose and 
that the United States had separate plants for good and bad chickens.” President George 
W. Bush addressed Putin’s concerns and told him “he was wrong about this.” Putin 
however seems content in that the “Bush legs” fiasco was finely orchestrated initiative by 
Washington to intentionally poison future Russo-American relationship. Interestingly, 
Bush felt that Putin’s information was not only inaccurate but that it was stemming from 
the ex-KGB advisors, Putin has employed.  
One of the most significant confrontations the United States has faced with Russia 
was the military initiative against Saddam Hussein in 2003. Putin considered Saddam a 
business associate, and more importantly a friend.129 Putin would send Primakov to 
Saddam with a secret message, “resign, retire, and make things easier on yourself.”130 
Putin trusted Primakov; after all, during the Cold War Primakov was staunchly anti-
American. He influenced just about every policy matter regarding the U.S. and Putin 
knew Primakov was the best option for taking sense into Saddam. However, Primakov’s 
efforts would fail. Saddam would refuse Putin’s and Primakov’s effort to save his life. In 
the end, as Bush’s effort to invade Iraq progressed, Putin would verbalize his impression 
that Bush was conducting himself not only unethically, but also in clear violation of the 
United Nation (UN) charter. This suggests that the rise in twenty-first century anti-
Americanism could be founded on both U.S. leaders and how Putin sees U.S. policy. 
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However, one could argue that Putin’s inability to move beyond a strong Communist past 
may be the sole premise for his opinions of the United States and that U.S. policy is only 
the catalyst for aggravating Putin.  
In March 2003, Fred Weir provided commentary that relations between the 
United States and Russia were getting frostier by the minute.131 Russia accused George 
W. Bush of resorting to Cold War tactics by deploying U-2 spy planes over Russia.  Putin 
also became upset with reports that surfaced claiming that Russia had sold arms and high 
tech surveillance equipment to Iraq in defiance of the UN Iraq sanctions.132 These 
statements alarmed Putin, who in turn sent strong anti-American messages throughout 
Russia with chastising rebuttals towards the United States for its allegedly inaccurate 
accusations. Putin scolded the United States publicly for making these presumptions.  
In response to Washington’s Iraq invasion, Putin would join forces with France. 
This would send and clear and unmistaken message that Putin disapproved of the U.S. 
attack. This caught Bush off guard. Throughout Russia, the United States was seen as 
egotistical, arrogant, and guilty of placing itself on a pedestal of superiority capable of 
ruling anyone at anytime. Under the control of Putin, Russian news and Putin himself 
were reporting the United States as monstrous, controlling, and behaving irresponsibly. 
President George W. Bush was portrayed as a political cowboy who was shooting from 
the hip because Saddam had tried to assassinate his father, Bush Senior years before.133 
Putin would initially refuse to support U.S. efforts in Iraq, and would stand firm on 
Russia’s position. Putin would conclude his disapproval by expressing to Bush via phone 
that his decision to invade Iraq was wrong, and that it would result in tremendous human 
suffering.134 He proceeded to tell Bush, “I feel bad for you.”135 
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Putin’s distrusting nature and Communist background his character has been 
defined as reactionary and pessimist towards George W. Bush and Washington. When 
Putin identifies something as anti-Russian, he frequently strikes back publicly with crude 
disparaging language. This forces Washington to engage in damage control and 
psychoanalyzing of Putin’s inferences in an effort to figure out his true motives.  
Putin claims that the United States refuses to see Russia as an equal partner and 
that it is this is the main cause of friction in Russo-U.S. relations.136 He claims that the 
United States portrays Russia as uncivilized, savage little dirty tree dwellers that need a 
good shave and bath.137 Putin asks the United States, “What makes you believe you have 
the right to interfere in our affairs? That is the main problem in our relationship.”138 Putin 
feels that he is not respected or perceived as having an opinion or intelligent position on 
Russia’s future within NATO or future U.S. policy. 
2. Failed Promises 
It could be argued that the United States has contributed to a rise in twenty-first 
Century Russian anti-Americanism. It certainly did not help that Vice President Dick 
Cheney publicly commented that when he did not share George W. Bush’s vision, and 
that when he looked into Putin’s eyes, he saw “KGB, KGB, KGB,” just as Senator 
McCain would.139 Furthermore, Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush had 
promised to address the Jackson-Vanik amendment but failed to do so, which led Putin to 
believe that Washington was full of empty promises. This amendment, contained in Title 
IV of the 1974 Trade Act, denied unconditional trade relations with Russia as it 
possessed a non-market economy restriction based on emigration opportunities.140  
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Putin’s administration would become frustrated with Washington and, more 
directly, George W. Bush. After agreeing to such measures as closing Russia’s Cuba 
bases, and ratifying the CTBT and the START II Treaties, Putin expressed that Moscow 
was doing everything the U.S. asked, and was receiving nothing in return.141 Even U.S. 
Ambassador John Bolton was quoted as saying “There was definitely a lot of heartburn 
that the relationship is all give and no get.”142 He believed that Russia’s complaints had 
merit, and that the Russians had the right to be dissatisfied with the United States. 
3. NATO Summit 
During NATO’s 2008 summit, President Bush proclaimed that “NATO expansion 
was absolutely necessary and that it would establish a strong unified Europe.”143 
Furthering his statements, as reported by Nile Gardiner of the Heritage Foundation in 
Washington, DC, “NATO is a strong reflection of President Bush’s firm conviction that 
the frontiers of freedom must be advanced across Europe right to the borders of Russia, 
and that is his legacy.”144 Through George W. Bush expressing such opinions, Russo-
American relations have suffered significantly. Granted, Clinton initiated NATO 
expansion but Bush too is a strong advocate of NATO’s growth and supports its 
progress.145 This is what Putin had hoped to avoid with another Bush in office. 
4. Political Puppeteer 
As Putin stepped down as president, it was debated whether he would fully 
relinquish presidential power.  He skillfully positioned Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev 
as his successor to the presidency, but many ponder whether or not Medvedev is not 
Putin’s political puppet. Putin stated during his February 2008 presidential speech:  
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The President is the head of state, guarantor of the Constitution, and sets 
the main domestic and foreign policy guidelines, but the highest executive 
power in the country is in the hands of the Government. There are enough 
powers to go around, and Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev and I will 
divide them between ourselves and build up our personal relations, if the 
voters give us such a chance. I can assure you that there will be no 
problems in this respect.146 
This would lead one to believe that Putin is not ready to step down and has chosen 
someone he can control. Putin is a master propagandist, and very good at articulating his 
message in a very transparent way that appears passive and obvious, but in actuality is 
very calculating. Putin knows the Russian people adore him, and want him to run for a 
third term. This works to his advantage, as it appears he can do no wrong. Economically, 
many feel Putin has saved Russia from economic disaster and international in equality, 
whether he deserves it or not. Interestingly, if Putin continues to enjoy widespread  
Russian support even as prime minister, it is likely that he is positioning himself to run 
for the presidency again, thereby solidifying his status as Russia’s great twenty-first 
century tsar.  
While Putin does not fully agree or wish to fully democratize Russia, he 
understands that democratic programs are not necessarily unrealistic.147 But he wants a 
managed democratic system in Russia.148 This would allow Putin to better control its 
political system and agenda, even as prime minister. 
D. PUTIN’S PUBLIC INFLUENCE 
Putin’s success is not one dimensional. He has managed to rally a nation that 
approves of his ideology and political presence. He maintained an overwhelming 70% 
approval rating over his past eight years in office.149 In comparison, most U.S. presidents 
generally lose a significant degree of approval towards the end of their terms. This shows 
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that Russians are not only very happy with Putin they are arguably not looking forward to 
a Russia without Putin. This influence on the Russian public is remarkable and quite 
frankly doubtful to be seen again, as Medvedev furthers his tenure as Russia’s newest 
head of state. Putin has increased the general sense of anti-Americanism that was not 
present in the 1990s during a time when Russo-American relations were quite favorable. 
After the end of the Cold War, Russia was welcoming the U.S. with open arms. Yeltsin 
was trying to defeat the remnants of lingering Soviet Communism and, at the same time, 
attract U.S. aid and interest. Granted, it can be argued he failed at both; Putin was handed 
a country eagerly trying to rebuild itself and suffering from a lost identity. 
On one hand, it seems that Putin wanted to work on improving Russo-American 
relations. On the other hand, he clearly supported the Russian people, the Soviet past, and 
seems very tongue-in cheek about truly welcoming Washington to Russia’s political 
table. Because the Soviets by nature distrusted the United States, it is possible that this 
involuntary emotion towards the U.S. had been hereditarily passed to Putin through a 
form or psychogenesis. Waltz theorized “individual behavior can be the result of 
misdirected aggression and stupidity.” 150 Putin’s expectation of becoming equal with the 
U.S. could be founded on his expectation to recapture a glorious Soviet past that was 
present during the twentieth-century. This premise could be founded on political 
aggression towards the U.S. and Russia’s inability to contend, which made Putin’s job of 
drumming up Russian anti-Americanism quite easy.   
1. Statistical Approval 
Interestingly, the generation born between 1976 and 1991 is considered the “Putin 
generation.”151 As reported by Mendelson and Gerber, it appeared that Putin’s first 
directive in an effort to restore Russia’s lost sense of dominance was to reinvent its lost 
pride. It is expected that pride in Putin will last for years to come since it is the younger 
generation that has benefited from his administration. In 2005, Mendelson and Gerber 
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conducted a survey that detailed how Russian’s felt about Stalin’s reign. It was noted that 
most did not feel Stalin did a bad job and that really he did “more good than bad.”152 One 
could argue that Putin is successfully convincing Russians that he is protecting them from 
aggressive external influences from the United States. His rhetoric could be convincing 
Russians that the U.S. is trying to push Russia around, and that Putin is standing in the 
way.153 
Putin’s behavior can be attributed to Rousseau’s theory that “man was as society 
created him.”154 In this instance, one could argue that while Soviet society may have 
created Putin, Putin has successfully influenced Russian society and its return to Soviet 
contempt for the U.S. Moreover, it would appear that this offers a logical explanation for 
Putin’s behavior.  But in order to position himself as a potentially great Russian leader, 
he also realizes he must help Russians realize higher salaries and a better quality of life, 
and exterminate the chaotic Yeltsin ear, when economic and political disorfer reared its 
ugly head as recently as the Yeltsin era, causing significant domestic problems and 
domestic friction. To do so, Putin consolidated key economic enterprises under state 
control. As Putin’s political success grows and oil is peaking at over $145 per barrel, 
Russia continues to find stability as a major oil producer, which yields increased 
governmental cash flow, resulting in Russian citizens enjoying an improved quality of 
life, a strengthened national identity, and major improvements in paid pensions. 
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Figure 1.   Russian Economy from 1991 thru 2005  
 
Figure 1 demonstrates that Putin’s administration has been successful in 
substantially enhancing Russia’s economic status and therefore yielding a better quality 
of life for Russian citizens in comparison with the Yeltsin administration. Putin has done 
a good job for Russia in general. He has developed a strong sense of Russian worth in 
that Russia is debt free, is revitalizing its military, and seemingly standing up to the 
United States. Putin continues to use anti-American rhetoric, and after stepping down 
from the presidency, was overwhelmingly welcomed as Russia’s prime minister. Putin is 
a neo-authoritarian whose leadership style and background enabled him to realize that 
logically, it is nearly impossible to compete with the United States. This has helped Putin 
rationalize what he sees as Russia’s place, but, at the same time, has hurt his political 
relations with the United States. His behavior has given the U.S. the impression he may 
still hold communist-type hostility towards Washington.  
E. CONCLUSION 
Max Weber notes: that, Interests, not ideas, dominate directly the actions 
of men. Yet the images of the world created by these ideas have very often 
served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of 
interests kept actions moving. 
Putin could be considered a dangerous man, but the threat is not material, it is 
presented in his politically aggressive rhetoric and questionable behavior towards the 
United States. He sees the world in a reflection that he has created. His interests could be 
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considered convoluted, and it is possible his Soviet psyche dominates his ethics. He is a 
product of a time past, and it would appear he is unable to let go of his nostalgia for a 
strong Soviet empire. One could logically argue that Putin does not take into 
consideration Russia’s current geo-political reality but only considers his desired image 
of Russia.   
Offering hints of anti-Americanism through his speeches and political actions, he 
is transparently influencing Russian society to believe that the United States is out to 
keep Russia from regaining international equality. As a neo-authoritarian leader, Putin 
has been compared to Benito Mussolini, Italy’s fascist dictator and a publicity conscious 
showman.155  
Putin’s media, political, and social regulations of Russia and insinuation that the 
United States is forcing his actions, lends credence to the presumption that Putin is 
confident that he can control public perceptions, Putin has eliminated all independence in 
the media and those who disobey are either exiled or fired.156  This was seen most 
recently when a local Russian newspaper, Moskovsky Korrespondent, reported that Putin 
had left his wife for a woman thirty years younger than him.157 Quickly imposing his 
will, he disbanded the paper. Putin has masterfully instituted the full-scale destruction of 
the autonomy of regional governments, and has weakened the Duma.  He has controlled 
electoral processes, falsely imprisoned his competition, and in some instances been 
linked to the murders of those who defy him. Hand picking Medvedev, it would seem, 
Putin will continue his reign as Russia’s puppeteer. At least Putin keeps in character. He 
is skillfully placing those into power that he feels closest to, and those he considers allies. 
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The youth of Russia now see the United States through Putin-filled anti-American 
lenses.158 Putin has promoted this shift and built his support among those who do not 
know any better. His neo-authoritarian leadership in selecting Medvedev as his 
predecessor screams corruption and is very reflective of past Soviet times. Throughout 
Putin’s tenure as president, he has yearned for political success, Russian independence, 
and international recognition, which appear present through his moments of defiance 
towards the United States. Taking this behavior into consideration, Putin himself can be 
seen as a primary factor in the rise of twenty-first Century Russian anti-Americanism. It 
would appear that Waltz’s first level of analysis is validated. 
Putin now visualizes the United States as an aggressor from which Russia must 
protect itself at all costs. Jervis observes, “If powers retreat, they will not only lose the 
specific value at stake but, more important in the long run, will encourage the aggressor 
to press harder.”159 Putin may very well anticipate that if he follows the U.S. agenda and 
NATO expansion that he and Russia will find themselves locked into years of serving the 
U.S., leading Moscow to give more and receive less, which could ultimately lead to 
weaker Russian influence. As the United States and NATO push forward with NATO 
expansion, Putin claims he is not afraid to use his resources if encroachment on Russian 
borders is not stopped.160  
As Putin has left office, the transformation of a fallen Soviet Union and the 
resurrection of Russia as a great power has been placed in the hands of Medvedev. Putin 
attempted to change the perception of Russia in the eyes of Washington by seeming to be 
accepting of U.S. policy early in his term. Prime Minister Putin will continue to influence 
and guide Medvedev politically and personally in his continues this effort to make Russia 
look as a serious contender to be dealt with. To date, it seems that Medvedev is already 
starting to mend Russo-American fences but it has yet to be determined if his political 
character resembles Putin’s. At the beginning of Putin’s term, he behaved very similar to 
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Medvedev in that on the outside it appeared he was trying to build a stronger Russo-
American alliance.  This leads one to believe that Russian anti-Americanism will 
continue to grow as Russia’s political ideology finds itself still on Putin’s watch. Putin’s 
actions and words regarding the United States will significantly influence future Russo-
American relations and Moscow’s new president.161  
When George W. Bush met Medvedev, he did not make any presumptions about 
Medvedev’s soul. His only comment was that Medvedev was a “straightforward fellow” 
and that he looked forward to working with him.162 It appeared Bush had realized that 
words would not change the basic foundation or opinions of a Russian politician. Putin 
embraced Bush’s compliment, but it did not change Putin’s rhetoric toward the U.S. This 
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III. RUSSIAN NATIONALISM 
A. SECOND LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
Chapter III examines Kenneth Waltz’s second level of analysis.163 This image 
theorizes that the nature of the state and society influences how a nation will act and 
respond to perceived adversity or aggressors. Waltz notes that wars are fought for the 
country and therefore that nationalism creates a sense of conformity and camaraderie. 
Focusing on Slavophiles, and the Orthodox Church, a relation may be drawn that a strong 
sense of Russian nationalism may have influenced the sentiment. Russia’s attitudes may 
have contributed to a increased sense of anti-Americanism and Russian nationalism 
putting into question the assumption that Russians would rather pursue strong relations 
with the United States rather than reconstructing a strong Russian identity.164 Neo-
conservatism in Russia during the 1990s emerged to these roots, the Russian past.165 
Arguably, one of the most storied debates in Russian history has been that 
between the Slavophiles and the Westernizers. Throughout the nineteenth-century, the 
debate would rage on and seemed to be most prominent from 1840-1861. It also occurred 
in the twentieth-century. The Slavophiles felt that Russia needed to work on its own 
history, develop its own culture, and protect its religion. Westernizers felt that Russia was 
backwards and needed to open to the West, its technology, and its more representative 
forms of government.   
Nationalism, in accordance with Waltz’s second level, offers an opportunity for 
society to rise. For example, Russian nationalism provided the platform that the 
Slavophiles and Christian Orthodox Church used to promote their agenda. This provides 
a distraction for the United States and thereby allows Russia an opportunity to maintain a 
peaceful situations at home.  Waltz quotes Bodin in that “the best way of preserving a 
state, and guaranteeing against sedition, rebellion and civil war is to keep the subjects in 
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amity one with another, and to this end, find an enemy against who they can make 
common cause.”166 This is a perfect example of current Russo-American relations. Anti-
Americanism had gradually increased and now is at its highest level in years. It can be 
debated that Russian nationalism has brought its citizens together in a way to overlook 
other internal problems.  
Waltz continues to theorize that states act on the expectations of their citizens. He 
uses that analogy that if we say a “pot is boiling, we actually mean the water inside is 
boiling.”167 This can be attributed to Russia in that its sense of anti-Americanism is 
founded on the ideology of its people. Russia may realize a sense of increased anti-
Americanism because historically, it has not totally desired an infusion of democratic 
structures and Western culture. Arguably, Russian nationalism may be the catalyst behind 
increased twenty-first century anti-Americanism.  
Richard Dobson pointed out over 10 years ago that some Russians did wish to 
work with the United States in an effort to better their social, economic, and political 
conditions.168 Their only stipulation was they did not want to lose equality with the West 
simply to adhere to a more positive relationship with Americans. During the past 10 
years, many Russians felt that America was trying to suppress Russia, weaken it, reduce 
its role in the international system, and solidify America’s own position as a dominant 
power.169 According to one Stavropol worker, “All troubles come from the West, we lack 
all independence.”170 By this it would appear the Russians may feel that they are unable 
to secure their own identity free of American influence. 
In this chapter, I first outline the basis premise and history of the Westernizers vs. 
Slavophiles debate, focusing more attention on Slavophile leadership and ideology. 
Throughout the debate, Westernizers were pushed aside by Slavophiles as Russia sought 
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a new identity. Moreover, Westernizers, were a pro-Western group that did not contribute 
to Russian anti-Americanism. Regardless, a brief historic perspective of their primary 
leaders and ideology is necessary. Second, Putin’s relationship with the Orthodox Church 
will be examined to include a brief examination of Putin’s influence and the Church’s 
political support of him. Additionally, this chapter will review a number of polls 
conducted by Sarah Mendelson that offer evidence that Russia identifies the United 
States in negative terms. The chapter intends on identifying that twenty-first century anti-
Americanism can be founded on the premise that Russia’s strong sense of nationalism 
prohibits them from accepting America’s Western ideology and that the Slavophiles 
movement attempted to protect Russia’s spirituality and organic history.     
B. WESTERNIZERS 
The Westernizers constituted a movement that considered Russians during the 
nineteenth century as illegitimate children who lacked a national identity.  Unlike 
Slavophiles, Westernizers were never a group; it is a term denoting Russian intellectuals 
who believed that Russia should be more like the West. One of the greatest leaders of the 
Westernizers movement was Petr Chaadaev. His beliefs established a group that 
eventually was called Westernizers by the Slavophiles. Westernizers believed that Russia 
needed to look to the West for guidance and national identity, and that Russia must 
identify with the West if it was to be successful.  
The basic premise of the Westernizers was that accepting some hints of 
Westernism could lead to a better Russia and that it could possibly help bring Russia out 
of the dark and regain some sort of history. It was perceived by the Westernizers that if 
Russia wanted a strong future, they would need to welcome Western technology and 
social opportunities. Russian’s who supported the integration of Western ideals thought 
that Russia was fooling itself in believing they were better off ignoring Western contacts. 




Russians have flattered themselves for centuries that we possess a moral 
nature of our own that is different from Western culture but just as 
valuable. On the contrary, it signifies formlessness, spiritual sloth, a dead-
end existence, not mysticism, but an all-destroying mediocrity of the 
soul.171 
The objectives of the Westernizers were to entice Russians to accept western 
social and political influence in an attempt to help Russia become unique and modern. 
They saw Slavophiles as ignorant and full of misguided utopianism.172 Westernizers 
would go so far in their attempt to discredit the Slavophiles that they would frequently 
refer to Slavophilism as a form of anti-religious and cultural anarchy.173 
1. Petr Chaadaev 
Petr Chaadaev was born in 1794, and is considered one of Russia’s best minds for 
planting controversy into the Slavophiles vs. Westernizers debate.174 Most notable for his 
“Philosophical Letters,” Chaadaev’s philosophical effort would be published in the 
Moscow journal Teleskop in 1836, meeting with sharp criticism by Nicholas I. The 
premise of the “Letters” was to question Russia’s relationship with the West and how it 
might be related to the structural demise of Russia’s culture and human capital. Chaadaev 
noted how backward Russia was and that it was culturally inferior and disconnected from 
the rest of the world.175 Chaadaev would become very critical of Russia and note: 
We, Russians, like illegitimate children, come to this world without 
patrimony, without any links with people who lived on the earth before 
usthis is a natural result of a culture based wholly on borrowing and 
imitation. There is among us no inward development, no natural 
progress….We grow, but we do not mature, we advance, but obliquely, 
that is in a direction which does not lead to the goal, Isolated in the world, 
we have given nothing to the world, we have taken nothing from the 
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world; we have not added a single idea to the mass of human ideas; we 
have contributed nothing to the progress of the human spirit. And we have 
disfigured everything we have touched of that progress.176 
His sentiments were clear, Russia had nothing to offer as it stood. Void of a 
worthy past, present, or future, Russia was debatably a damaged country socially.177 
Chaadaev theorized that Russia had been exiled from world history because of Russian 
Orthodoxy. This perception can be logically traced since Russia’s Orthodox religion did 
encourage retreating from the rest of the world that did not share its religious beliefs. But 
Chaadaev would also be very critical of Peter the Great and his attempt to Westernize 
Russia. He would theorize that Peter had failed civilize Russia and that he tried to make 
Russia appear better superficially though transparent import initiatives with the West. 
Chaadaev thought Peter was so excessive in his efforts to make Russia appear 
Westernized that he forgot about what it meant to be Russian and possess its own 
identity. Chaadaev’s aggressive anti-Russian banter would set the premise for future 
debates between the Slavophiles and Westernizers. Chaadaev’s work would cause such 
outrage and political concern that in 1837 he would be placed under house arrest, be ruled 
insane and placed under a doctor’s care.178 However, in 1838, was given his freedom 
under one condition: he was never to write again.179 
2. Vissarion Grigoryevich Belinsky 
Born in 1811, Belinsky’s father was a poor doctor and the family was of common 
Russian stock.180 Growing up, Belinsky’s home was full of violence that seemed to 
mirror the streets of his neighborhood. Disliking his father’s foul language and bitterness, 
Belinsky would leave home at the age of 14 finding refuge in a nearby gymnasium in 
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Penza.181 In 1829, he would gain acceptance to Moscow University only to be expelled 
three years later for his aggressive criticism of serfdom in a play he wrote called Dmitry 
Kalinin.182 
Belinsky’s theorized his concept of images through his work, The Idea of Art. 
This effort would identify in Belinsky’s mind that all things were derived of one’s own 
thoughts and capabilities.183 He argued that spirituality, nature, life, humanity, history, 
and the universe were only existed because people wanted them to.184 Belinsky would 
further his theory in observing that all things were a creation of man and that western 
idealism would only bring greater strength to Russia. He offered that  
Every great man performs the deeds of his time, solves contemporary 
problems, expresses in his activity the spirit of the times in which he was 
born and developed.185 
Belinsky would argue that every great nation was a derivative of its own internal 
leadership. He would interject that Russia was free and capable because of the tsars that 
came before.186 When Russia was faced with the Tatars, it was Ivan the Terrible who 
came to their rescue.187 When Russia needed to open its “window to the West,” it was 
Peter the Great that unlocked it.188 So just as these great Russian leaders tried to protect 
and engage Russia, Belinsky felt that only those with the internal will could change 
Russia. This would include opening Russia’s arms to Western ideas and technology. 
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3. The Decembrists 
In 1825, approximately 2500 members of the Russian army and nobility 
attempted to overthrow Nicolas I due to his authoritarian leadership and government.189 
Many of its members were of very wealthy families and welcomed the attempted fusion 
of European Restoration and improvements to Russian society that was expected from 
embracing western ideas.190 The members also considered themselves Westernizers and 
believed that including Russia with western opportunity would only better Russia in the 
long run.191  
One of the most famous Decembrists, P.G. Kakhovskii would write Nicholas 
while in prison, “It is a bitter thing for a Russian not to have a nation, and to terminate 
everything in the Sovereign alone.”192 The Decembrists movement had hoped for 
enlightenment of Russia, which would need Western influence to prosper and grow. 
Without this, it would seem that what Kakhovskii was trying to say was that Russia was 
doomed to continue without identity and with only a failing image that would never 
flourish. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Westernizers pushed for an elective 
assembly of nobles and for emancipation of the serfs. Later, more radical movements 
occurred calling for the adoption of Western socialist concepts and the overthrow of the 
tsar. Radicals, including Lenin’s brother, carried out attempted assassinations of Tsar 
Alexander II in the 1870s, finally succeeding in 1881. While tasrism was restored, World 
War I created conditions for tsarism’s overthrow by radical, communist-led Westernizers. 
For 70 years they attacked Russian religion and its nobility with radical Western ideas, 
although with a totalitarian streak that alienated Western democracies.  
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C. THE SLAVOPHILES 
The Slavophiles were a nineteenth century group of Russian intellectuals mainly 
comprised of petty nobility, well educated but not considered Europeanized like much of 
the upper Russian aristocracy. They supported the protection of Russian nationalism, 
strong Slavic heritage, and distinctive culture. They represented Russian Orthodoxy, old 
noble families, and traditional family beliefs. They discounted Western ideology, which 
they saw as including liberalism, socialism, and rationalism. Moreover, Slavophiles 
viewed their movement as the premise of the Orthodox Church.193 They believed they 
were employed with the responsibility of protecting Russia’s rich historic and moral 
value and organic thought.194 Slavophiles did not think that the Western ideas were 
necessarily bad, they just felt that those who progressed with Western ways had taken a 
“wrong turn” in life and only the Orthodox Church could reroute them to salvation.195 
The Slavophiles were drawn to Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s impression that Russian 
should not try to solve problems through intellect but instead though the foundations of 
God.196 Slavophilism is based on the theory of finding ones way with the help of God 
and not the technological advancements or opportunity that Western society may provide. 
The heart can lead one to salvation, not the excessive condoning of rationalism. They 
believed that the West lacked moral values and more importantly, a soul. Slavophiles felt 
that those who would welcome the West were traitors to Russian nationalism. They also 
felt that those embracing Western ideology were betraying the Russian soul and favoring 
an arrogant West. 
Slavophiles believed that the history of Russian culture was worth 
protecting and embracing.197 They also felt that the most important 
difference between themselves and the Westernizers could be traced to 
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religion and morality.198 Closeness to Orthodoxy and its Christian beliefs 
were absolute in considering oneself a true Russian. It was readily 
understood that Russia’s past was full of suffering and disappointment. 
But Slavophiles found it illogical to give up their cultural heritage and 
succumb to the Western, which they perceived as offensive to Russian 
values. 
Clearly, to be Russian, was not easy. It required a sense of determination and 
drive as well as acceptance of a difficult past. However, it was not worth throwing away 
for ease of life, loss of spirituality, and encouragement of immorality and Western norms.  
1. Ivan Kireevsky 
Arguably, the most influential leader of the Slavophile movement and one of its 
founders was Ivan Kireevsky. Born to the nobility, Kireevsky would grow up reading 
Russian literature, fluently speaking German, and nearly memorizing French literature.199 
Throughout Kireevsky’s life, the word “national” became part of his identity. He would 
repeatedly see Russia as possessing a strong national uniqueness that was worth holding 
onto. Upon graduating from Moscow University, he joined the Society of Lovers of 
Wisdom. His education focused around Christian Orthodoxy and notably, Pushkin’s 
poetry and literary works. He believed that the premise of all Russian humanity was the 
existence of a strong national culture.200 
Kireevsky would note that while much of Russia’s history may have been 
imported from other Western entities, Russia was unique and needed to continue with the 
creation of a coherent national philosophy that would amplify Russian society and 
culture.201 Kireevsky may have accepted and even appreciated Western influences, he 
felt that the West would soon wear out its welcome. 
Kireevsky would argue that religion and the internal strength of Russia would 
secure its place in history. He was known best for his philosophical views and support of 
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the Russian Orthodox Church. Just as Orthodoxy had defeated Catholic efforts to 
transform Russia spiritually, he believed that Russia’s faith would rescue and protect it 
from Western principles and influences. He would rally Russians to be heard and to voice 
their personality and to embrace his doctrine of “integral cognition,” which also referred 
to “their faith.”202 
2. Aleksei Khomyakov 
Many Russian scholars argue whether it was Khomyakov or Kireevsky that 
actually founded Slavophilism.203 But most argue that Khomyakov was the more 
academically rounded, intellectual, and possessed a greater sense of Slavophilism, its 
philology, journalism, and poetry. 204 
Khomyakov was born in 1804 and would die in 1860. His background is very 
similar to Kireevsky and his parents would raise him with strong religious beliefs and 
respect for the peasants they owned and were responsible for.205 His personality was 
powerful and charismatic, and he employed the ability to gain great admiration and 
respect from those who would encounter him. Moreover, his beliefs were strongly 
connected to Russian nationalism, its traditions, and the concept of protecting Orthodoxy 
and Russian uniqueness.206 
He disapproved of Europe’s attempt to force Russia into western Europeanism 
and would argue that Europe was founded on the premise of feudalism.207 He would 
argue the importance of national purity and the ability to deny European materialism and 
what he perceived as Catholic authoritarianism.208 Khomyakov felt that the necessity of 
maintaining an inner holiness had to be protected and that that only way to realize this 
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was to protect the Russian Orthodox Church. Moreover, it would seem that Khomyakov 
felt that the Westernizers were corrupt not only intellectually, but also spiritually. He 
believed that accepting Western idealism would only lead to Russia further losing grasp 
of their national and religious identity. He would further note while addressing the Bible 
and its scriptures that, 
Christianity is nothing other than freedom in Christ….I consider the 
church to have greater freedom than the Protestants. For Protestantism 
holds the Scriptures to be an infallible and at the same time external 
authority, while to the church the Scriptures are evidence of herself; she 
regards them as an inner fact of her own existence. It is therefore quite 
erroneous to suppose that the church demands enforced unity or enforced 
obedience; on the contrary, the church abhors both the former and the 
latter, for in matters of faith enforced unity is falsehood and enforced 
obedience is death209  
Alexander Panarin would theorize that to be anti-Western was to be anti-
American.210 It would be logical to presume that during the nineteenth century and thus 
spilling over into the twentieth century, the Orthodox Church perceived Western and 
eventually U.S. influence as unwelcome and crude. The Orthodox Church would see 
America as a self-serving, destructive entity that was attempting to take over the world 
with mass globalization and political aggressiveness.211 The church would reject Western 
idealism and its obsession with the market economy and the social and physical 
sciences.212 It would become reliant on spiritual necessity and opportunity and focus on 
matters of God and nature.213  
But the church faced virtual destruction under Communist rule. Only in the late 
1980s did it begin to re-emerge as an independent force in Russia life. Today, it has been 
restored almost as a quasi-official church in its relations with the Russian state. 
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Mendelson and Gerber note in their 2002 study that Russians firmly cemented in 
Orthodoxy tend to see Americans more negatively. This can be attributed to the 
relationship between the Orthodox Church and Slavophiles. Both have historically 
disapproved of Westernism and its aggressive attempt to infuse Russia with its 
technology and spiritually inferior society. 
3. Putin and the Orthodox Church 
Throughout Putin’s tenure as president and now prime minister he has always 
enjoyed the support of the Russian Orthodox Church. In November 2007, just before 
elections were to be held, Putin called upon Orthodox followers and Alexei II the 
Church’s patriarch to support his transition to prime minister and Medvedev’s election as 
president.214 In response, the church would support Putin and Medvedev causing some to 
express that the relationship was an “unholy alliance,”215  
Putin also commented that the Orthodox Church needed to honor their obligation 
to him and Medvedev by not only supporting him but expressing to the Russian people 
that he was a moral and spiritual leader.216 Putin would further state that, “Orthodoxy has 
always had a special role in shaping our statehood, our culture, our morals”217 
Putin seems to imply that his behavior and the policies of the Russian Federation 
were a direction reflection of the Church. He would further note that the Orthodox 
Church should support him and Russia just as all other Russian citizens would.  It would 
appear that through Putin’s statement, he was calling for the continuation of his own 
power within the walls of the Kremlin through the support of Orthodoxy, and the church 
was willing to comply. Throughout Putin’s presidential tenure, he supported the 
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Orthodox Church and protected it from liberalism and Western influence.218 For 
example, he has placed strict limits on the activities of foreign missionaries in Russia, 
even going so far as to ban certain denominations. It would seem that as he positioned 
himself to take over as prime minister, he was calling upon the church as a form of 
payback for his loyalty. 
D. SLAVOPHILES VS. WESTERNIZERS 
It seems the United States is revisiting this debate but in different terms. Spilling 
over from the late 1990s, the twenty-first century continues to witness an increased 
sentiment of Russian anti-Americanism and declining relations between the U.S. and 
Moscow. While many Russians applaud U.S. democratic intervention with the 
expectation that it will bring a better life for Russia, many Russians distrust the United 
States. Russians collectively view the United States, their motives, and political behavior 
as controlling. Russians do not necessarily wish for U.S. intervention in the development 
of their social, cultural, or national aspirations. Notably, this parallels the Slavophiles vs. 
Westernizers debate that occurred during the nineteenth-century. Slavophiles refused 
Western influence deeming it wrong for Russia and without substance. It would seem this 
sentiment had been revisited during a very young twenty-first century.  
Figure 2 examines Russian public opinion polls conducted from 1995 thru 1999. 
These polls offer that Russian citizens were becoming disenchanted with the United 
States and felt that the U.S. was not only challenging Russian nationalism but also its 
solidarity. One could argue that most expected better post-Soviet relations with the 
United States. Russians during the mid to late 1990s began to realize a greater 
involvement by the United States in its efforts to transform Russia into another politically 
structured democracy. In 1994, just two years later, the honeymoon was over. Russians 
began to feel threatened by the U.S.: its economic dominance, military superiority, and 
morally loose ideology.  
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Source: VTsIOM219 National sample 
Figure 2.   Western Democracy is Incompatible with Russia’s Traditions220 
 
Interestingly, the twenty-first century seems to repeat itself in line with the 
Slavophile’s vs. Westernizer’s debate. Similar to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
during the twenty-first century, many Russians did wish to adopt Western ideology, 
morals, and in some instances technology. A chief concern was not to absorb too many 
U.S. morals, since that may have been perceived as less than suitable for religiously 
driven Russians.  
Figure 3 offers statistical data that, as mentioned, Russian’s feel Putin and his 
plan has been successful. Russian approval of him and the agencies he controls, mainly 
the army and presidential office, grew from 78 percent in 2005 to 82 percent in 2007.221 
Mendelson and Gerber’s survey displayed that young Russians were very happy with 
Putin and felt he was on the right path.222 
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 1995 1996 1997 1999 
Agree 50% 52% 56% 55% 
Disagree 28% 27% 14% 30% 
Do not know 22% 21% 20% 15% 
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Figure 3.   How Much Do Russians Trust? 
 
In 2008, Mendelson and Gerber conducted a number of surveys that concluded 
Russian anti-Americanism had become more prevalent in the twenty-first century. 
Furthermore, it appeared their survey connected this sentiment with Russia’s strong sense 
of nationalism Commonly referred to as “jackals,” Russians felt that the United States 
always seemed to interfere with everyone else’s social and political issues and 
continually attempted to impose its foreign policy.223 Of the respondents interviewed, 
approximately 70% viewed the United States in very negative terms.224 Approximately 
63% of Russian polled felt that Americans were either an enemy or a rival.225 When 
asked how many of those polled felt the United States tortured suspects only 13% 
disagreed. A resounding 77% did believe that the United States tortured and abused 
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terrorist suspects. Most of these interviewed were young Russians, most educated, and 
had good jobs. One may argue that Russians are anti-American because they are not able 
to understand the American way. But if Mendelson and Gerber’s public opinion polls tell 
us anything, it is that Russians making these decisions are educated and reside in urban 
areas.  
It is hard to believe that during the late twentieth century relations between the 
United States and Russia seemed to be on a positive path. However, as the United States 
closes 2008 it may be on a verge of another Cold War-type relationship with a very 
nationalist and aggressive Russia. When polled regarding who Russians felt was a danger 
to them other than the United States, they mentioned Georgia.226 Based on the August 
2008 Russo-Georgian conflict should the United States be preparing itself for a potential 
Russian intervention elsewhere? 
E. CONCLUSION 
When the Cold War ended and Russia transitioned from a strong Communist state 
to a lost, politically damaged nation. It appears that the Slavophile vs. Westernizers 
debate and the Orthodox Church were strong factors in setting the foundation for twenty-
first century anti-Americanism. However, it would seem that when Russia lost its 
Communist face in the early 1990s, it also lost its national identity. Struggling to find 
themselves, Russians they would become angry with the U.S. and its sudden surge in 
power once the Soviet Union fell. While the United States got stronger, Russia became 
disintegrated and politically ignored. National flags were not flown, and the Russian 
national anthem was not heard. Russians would logically begin to attack the United States 
for damaging Russia and placing it in such dire circumstances. President Reagan and his 
famous request to “tear down that wall”227 would seemingly give Russians the 
impression that Unites States was completely behind the fall of the Soviet Union and the 
creation of a weak Russia. 
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Russia became angry during the 1990s and the way in which the United States 
seemed to discount what Russia had gone through historically. They also complained that 
the United States was stingy with aid when Russians faced economic difficulties and 
even food shortages after throwing off Communism. Yeltsin would publish an number of 
articles regarding Russia and its attempts to regain a national identity. Russian’s had 
suffered and given a great deal. They felt that the United States and the geopolitical 
agenda were trying to keep Russia from regaining a strong national identity and from 
further integration of Russia in to the international community.228 Sergei Kortunov, a 
former Soviet arms control expert for the federation, claimed that the United States 
viewed Russia as trying to become an imperial power. It was in his opinion that 
Washington, was attempting to persuade international leaders to avoid Moscow 
politically.229  
As Dmitry Ryurikov writes, between 1992 and 1998, Russian lacked a national 
identity more so than ever.230 Since the Cold War was over and Communism was gone, 
one could argue that Russian’s had no idea who they were, The problem was, they had no 
idea how to embrace their history and transition into a new dawn for a post-Soviet 
Russia. They would become engulfed with U.S. consumerism and fail to identity their 
own path of political and economic fairness for Russian citizens.231 One could argue that 
Russians lashed out at the United States because they felt the U.S. was bringing Western 
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IV. BALANCE OF POWER 
A. THIRD LEVEL OF ANALYSIS 
For what can be done against force without force?232 
Marcus Cicero233 
Kenneth Waltz’s third level of analysis offers that state behavior is determined by 
the distribution of power among nations. How Russia defines its role in this power 
struggle can be directly related to how it sees itself in the international community, 
system, and political arena. Russia feels that the international balance of power if off 
kilter and that while the United States appears to have the upper hand on political power, 
Russia is realizing a decline in political opportunities and influence.  
Robert Jervis theorizes that “wishful thinking, defense mechanisms, and 
motivated distortions of reality force the unemotional person to draw inferences and 
evidence based on a confusing situation or world.”234 One of the points this chapter will 
argue is that, Moscow’s perception of how the United States is treating Russia appears 
distorted and based on ambiguous evidence. Putin does not support the U.S. missile 
defense initiatives and it would appear that Putin’s intentions are to transform Russo-
American relations to a point that a re-establishment of Cold War equality could be 
realized with the United States. 
Finding an acceptable middle and political sharing of what Russia perceives as 
satisfactory international balance of power could limit a continual increase in twenty-first 
century anti-Americanism. Russia appears to find it necessary to project its limited power 
in an effort to feel it is being given an equal opportunity to Influence to the international 
community. But, as Russia continues to see that the world has become unipolar and the 
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U.S. is on top, it feels a greater sense of insecurity. Russian concerns may be well-
founded regarding their internal and external security. Arguably with the United States 
possessing so much power, Moscow may feel it will eventually find itself unable to 
defend itself.  
Hedley Bull theorizes that a stable balance of power requires several basic 
foundations for the accomplishment of state preservation.235 One might consider that 
first, a balance of power is necessary throughout the entire international system so that 
there cannot be a quest for universal empires.236 Arguably, when nations are part of a 
bipolar or multi-polar world, options for balancing are typically better than a unipolar 
system. For this reason, Russia may be substituting aggression for its internal fear of the 
United States. Bull also theorizes that in order for a stable balance of power to exist there 
must be international order in diplomacy, war, and power management among 
international actors, notably the United States and Russia.  
Russia argues that Washington’s political agenda and international influence 
unfairly places it in a dominate position superior to Moscow. Putin would argue that 
Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush attempted to make Russia subservient via 
empty pleasantries and unfulfilled promises. Bull states that the balance of power forms a 
system of checks and balances that prevents one state from being able to absorb 
another.237 Russia’s place in the balance of power has been sorely weakened. This may 
force Russia to think the United States could politically control it and influence its 
internal state sovereignty. Since Putin’s election to the presidency in 2000, Russian 
sentiment has been that the United States has not been trying to improve political 
relations with Russia.  
As Russia continues to address its internal security and modernize its 
conventional, nuclear, and space systems, it continues to come up short. Consequently, 
with Russia’s continual bullying of nearby countries in an effort to regain its place, it has 
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become nothing more than a political annoyance. During the mid twentieth-century, the 
USSR was a country taken seriously, possessing weapons systems, leadership, and the 
strength necessary to make an impression upon the international community. With this 
lost, one of Russia’s greatest fears in a unipolar world is that if it does not strengthen its 
internal and external security, the United States will eventually dictate Moscow’s policy 
and further threaten its survival as a nation.   
It appears that the United States is attempting to further develop Russo-American 
relations and it is arguable whether or not it perceives Russia as a threat. Because of 
Russia’s weak position in the balance of power, the United States may see Russia as a 
controllable entity. This may translate to Moscow as a blatant disrespect for a once strong 
USSR thereby increasing twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism. It may also 
paint a picture that the United States is arrogant and politically pretentious. With 
Washington’s missile defense agenda, its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and its 
widely publicized disapproval of Russia’s CFE violations failures, Moscow may be 
rattled and concerned that the United States is becoming unstoppable.  
As Russia’s continue to realize it no longer fits into the international system as a 
superpower, it continues to readdress the issue by recruiting and bullying neighboring 
countries into joining its effort against the United States. Bull theorizes that Russia does 
not see a stable or favorable position in its current state of affairs in comparison to the 
United States. Since Russia doesn’t perceive a balance between itself and the U.S. it 
appears to feel that the United States dictates policy where it benefits Washington.  
With this in mind, Moscow is attempting to improve its nuclear capability in an 
effort to keep up with the United States. Moscow seems adamant on continuing to 
modernize its MIRV capability and claims that defending itself with nuclear weapons is a 
possibility if pushed. Russia is also revitalizing its space program in an effort to eliminate 
U.S. hegemony over world affairs and its internal security.238 In 2010, after the U.S. 
space shuttle is scheduled to be retired, Russia will control access to the International 
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Space Station (ISS), a step towards Russia grasping for strength lost during the fall of the 
USSR.239 Moreover, Russia’s space program presents some expectation that 
technologically, Russia is progressing. However, it is clear they are still many years 
behind the U.S. in regards to system efficiency and modernization in the military sector.  
Chapter IV analyzes theories of defensive and offensive realism and how Waltz 
and Mearsheimer explain Russia’s security dilemma’s in relation to their degraded 
position in the balance of power. Could Russia’s impression of how it fits into the 
international system be driving it to attack U.S. policy? Furthermore, is the perception 
that the country must modernize and expand its military and nuclear capability in order to 
protect itself well-founded? The chapter analyzes whether or not Russian views regarding 
its reduced power and its new struggle to balance against the U.S. can be considered 
logical and are connected to failed CFE, ABM, and START II treaties. This chapter will 
attempt to connect twenty-first century Russian anti-Americanism with evaluations of 
how Russia fits into the international system and how U.S. hegemonic superiority could 
be driving this sentiment. 
1. Defensive Realism 
Defensive realism, also referred to as “structural realism,” was created in the late 
1970s by Kenneth Waltz. He suggests that states “desire to merely survive and realize an 
equal degree of security.”240 He also contended that states tend to disregard cooperation 
with other states in an effort to survive.241 This is because concerns about relative losses 
in capability become of greater interest, thus forcing states to balance against each other 
out of fear.242 This appears to offer explanation as to why Russia refuses to work with 
Washington on foreign policy matters. They are afraid of losing further competitive 
advantages when compared to the United States. Arguably, the concept behind Russia’s 
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fear can be addressed as Russia’s concern that the U.S. will eventually take over their 
internal and external security if Russia engages in cooperation. The problem is that 
Russia has very little to offer the United States other than natural resources, and even 
those are of little interest to Washington.       
Jeffery Taliaferro offers that four auxiliary assumptions underline defensive 
realism.243 These assumptions about the roots of state concerns are: “security dilemmas, 
offensive-defensive balance, material power, and domestic politics.”244 Each of these 
areas contributes significantly to how Russia fits into the balance of power and how it 
sees itself. Some defensive realists argue that the international system is more agreeable, 
offering opportunities and, in some cases, incentives for expansion, but only when such 
moves can be accomplished at low risk.245 Russia perceives international expansion 
around its borders as an opportunity to regain power and territory it lost when the USSR 
fell. When states attempt to strengthen their own security, it is typical for other states to 
realize a subsequent decline in power.246 This can be related to the Russian-Georgian 
crisis. Russia tried to gain additional power through the absorption of Georgia; as a result, 
Georgia lost significant military manpower, money, and hopes of regaining its former 
territories and citizens.  
Russia is considering how to best use its resources in an effort to regain its lost 
Soviet power. Defensive realists theorize that “material power” can be used as a 
foundation for driving states’ foreign policy perceptions.247 Taliaferro notes that this 
“material power” is commonly referred to as “structural modifiers.”248 These modifiers 
can guide a state in the direction of technological modernization, offensive-defensive 
balance of its military, and, in some instances, access to raw material.249 Defensive 
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realists also theorize that these modifiers are significant in international conflict and 
generally do influence conflict more so than the mere balance of power between states.250  
The self-perpetuating concern that Russia believes that the United States is attempting to 
take over Russia politically may have led Putin to generate other related concerns that in 
turn force Moscow to seek alternate solutions to defy the U.S. 251 Defensive realists also 
contend that states will respond to the anarchy of the international system with the use of 
force only out of fear instead of hegemonic desires.252  
2. Offensive Realism 
Offensive realism is founded on the idea that there is no “status quo” in 
international politics and that “states looks for opportunities to gain power by taking 
advantage of rival states.”253 Offensive realists also state that an anarchical international 
system strongly favors expansion.254 Russia perceives the United States as attempting to 
weaken and dominate its policies. John Mearsheimer argues that great powers must 
possess the ability to utilize a sufficiently large military capable of effectively fighting, 
winning, and gaining international power and dominance or risk another country doing 
this to them.255 Russia sees this as a lose-lose situation because of the U.S. position on 
the ABM, CFE, and BMD. As the United States continues to support NATO expansion 
which has led to the positioning of NATO troops closer to Russian borders, Moscow 
appears to be getting nervous about what the true intentions of the United States are. 
Washington’s policy of developing a strong BMD program and positioning ABM sites in 
Poland and the Czech Republic may make Russia sense that the United States is 
attempting to threaten and control it. 
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Mearsheimer256 furthers his development of offensive realism in his book, The 
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, arguing that some international actors will identify 
ways to solidify their position as great international powers. He further notes that, “states 
will constantly worry about their survival because potential competitors may try to 
eliminate them at any time.”257 Russia may anticipate that in order to restore its position 
in the international system it must portray itself as an aggressive international bully that 
the United States must contend with. What Russia has on its side is a very antagonistic 
Soviet past that infuses fear into some countries. On the one hand, this may allow Russia 
to get its way, but on the other hand it presents Russia as a very distrustful nation to deal 
with. Mearsheimer notes: 
Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today 
and tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their 
security is to achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a 
challenge by another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up 
an opportunity to become hegemonic in the international system because if 
thought it already had sufficient power to survive. 
Russia seems to be striving for international or at least Eurasian dominance 
through a sequence of political maneuvers that not only seem quite anti-American but 
anti-Western. 
Hans J. Morgenthau theorizes that nations seek to strengthen their internal and 
external stability through the improvement of their military, economy, or security 
capabilities, regardless of moral ideology.258 This international relations theory is also 
referred to as simple power politics. In an effort to gain back a relative degree of its 
international power, Russia appears to discount politically ethical behavior, as seen in 
Moscow’s threats and attempts to bully weaker states in its neighborhood. During a 
roundtable press conference during the 2007 G8 meetings, Putin was asked, “If the 
United States continues building a strategic shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, will 
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we not return to the situation and times in which the former Soviet Union’s nuclear forces 
were focused on European cities, on European targets?”259 Putin replied, “Certainly. Of 
course we will return to those times….Of course we must have new targets in 
Europe.”260  
These statements are politically directed towards these former Soviet states in that 
they might become new European targets for Russia if the U.S. continues to move 
forward with its BMD initiative.  
B. ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY 
In 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon and General Secretary of the USSR 
Leonid Brezhnev concluded the ABM Treaty, which remained in effect for 30 years. 
After the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the treaty on June 13, 2002, an association was 
created between the ABM Treaty and a rise in twenty-first century anti-Americanism. 
The U.S. departure came six months after giving the obligatory notice of its intentions to 
Russia, a move that infuriated Moscow. One day after the U.S withdrew from the ABM 
Treaty, Russia retaliated by withdrawing from the START II Treaty.  
It is important to realize that the purpose of the ABM Treaty between the United 
States and the USSR was to place stringent limitations and regulatory guidance on anti-
ballistic missile systems. The accord was simple; it would keep both the United States 
and Russia honest in the advancement of ICBM and SLBM technology and capability by 
reducing their incentive to build more missiles to overcome defenses. However, Russia 
perceived the U.S withdraw of as sudden and politically motivated. It would end Putin’s 
expectations that Russia and the United States would continue relatively congenial 
strategic relations.261 
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During President Putin’s 2001 trip to the Bush ranch Presidents George W. Bush 
and Putin addressed the student body at Crawford High School. A question was directed 
to both Bush and Putin regarding U.S. missile defense systems and the probability that 
they would end up in Europe. President Bush explained that he felt the 1972 ABM treaty 
was outdated and that it needed to be revised at best. He explained that the treaty was 
effective “during a time when the U.S. and Soviet Union hated each other but now times 
were different and both governments needed to move on.”262 President Bush stated that 
even thought they did not share the same views on missile defense; their relationship was 
strong enough to endure these differences. This notion obviously was not shared by 
Putin. 
This dispute created a resounding sense in Russia that the United States again was 
using its military and political might to enforce its will. Moscow later proposed to the 
United States that instead of placing their BMD sites in both Poland and the Czech 
Republic that it could instead co-utilize Russian radars located in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and 
in Southern Russia.263 What Putin was counting on was that by offering this to the United 
States, it would dislodge currentU.S. policy interest in positioning BMD systems in 
countries that Russia may perceive potential security threats.  
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Mull, the U.S. acting 
assistant secretary for political-military affairs, noted that the United States would not 
accept nor change its BMD initiative, or consider Putin’s offering of Gabala as a 
substitute over using the Czech Republic or Poland for its missile sites.264 Dr. Rice would 
provide vague commentary that the United States was interested in continued Russo-
American talks in an effort to develop “constructive dialogue.” regarding BMD.265 
However, it is doubtful whether the proposal was ever seriously discussed. 
                                                 
262 “President Bush and President Putin Talk to Crawford Students,” White House website, 15 
November 2001, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011115-4.html (accessed 20 
February 2008).  
263 Pyotr Goncharov, “US versus Russia on ABM,” Novosti, 17 July 2007, 
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_Versus_Russia_On_ABM_999.html (accessed, 12 June  2008).  
264 Goncharov, “US versus Russia on ABM.” 
265 Ibid. 
  68
C. CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE 
The original CFE treaty was signed in November 1990 in Paris, France, and was a 
reflection of over 16 years of negotiations with 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries.266 
While considered the result of the political wizardry of George H.W. Bush, its success 
cannot be attributed to any single person, and its demise also cannot be attributed to 
Russia, Putin, or any specific U.S. administration. Overwhelmingly approved during the 
1989 NATO Brussels Summit and officially concluded in 1990, the CFE has continued to 
be a major source of political drama and increased anti-Americanism in Russia. For 
Russia, the purpose of the treaty was simple. It would place limits on the number of 
conventional military assets Russia could place throughout the territory of the former 
USSR in return for similar limits to NATO forces. This would prevent both sides from 
orchestrating conventional arms build-ups, engaging in potential mass offensives in 
Europe, and, more importantly, prevent small-scale surprise attacks. 
With Russian military personnel and equipment still in Moldova and Georgia and 
against Russia’s 1999 Istanbul commitments, NATO refuses to ratify the modified CFE 
treaty. Putin responded by stating that the military forces left in Moldova are nothing 
more than retirees, and the harmless equipment is operationally degraded.267 Regardless 
of why Russian military assets are still in Moldova and Georgia, Russia’s April 2007 
withdrawal from the CFE treaty sent chilling reminders of Russia’s continuing Cold War 
mentality.268 
1. Warsaw Pact and CFE Ratification 
With the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the integration of new NATO 
members and NATO’s progressive expansion during the 1990s, Moscow began to call 
into question the CFE and demand it be modified to account for new NATO members in 
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an effort to prevent a NATO troop buildup on Russian borders.269 In an effort to push for 
a modified CFE, Russia unilaterally agreed to pull its troops out of Georgia and Moldova. 
Russia hoped would entice the United States and NATO to agree to its demands and 
modify the CFE. However, after the United States and NATO agreed to the modifications 
based on the notion that Russia would remove its troops from Georgia and Moldova, 
Russia declared that the issue of troop removal was separate from the proposed CFE 
ratification.270 Russia would not agree to remove its troops from Georgia and Moldova 
and therefore the United States and NATO declared that the CFE would not be ratified 
until this has been accomplished.271 This became a significant political sore spot for 
Russia. It did not see it necessary to pull all troops out of Georgia and Moldova and felt 
that a U.S.-controlled NATO was trying to bully it into submission.  
2. Political Considerations 
The problem with the CFE treaty is that it was initiated by the United States. 
Russia perceives the CFE as nothing more than another attempt by the United States to 
use its overwhelming military and political power to influence the international 
community. Russia describes the CFE as no longer serving meaningful purposes for 
Russia, and not conforming to its current or future military position or political 
obligations.272  Russia is also discouraged by the developmental progress of the United 
States in placing conventional arms in post-Warsaw Pact, states such as Bulgaria and 
Romania. To Moscow it defies CFE Treaty modifications proposals to stay away from 
Russian borders, which the United States has done by planning to place BMD systems in 
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expected the United States to respond just as it has.  Sergey Karaganov stated that “The 
United States is predictable,” leading one to believe that Russia’s anti-American culture 
sees the United States as nothing more than hypocritical.273  
3. Russia’s Continued Presence in Georgia 
In July 2007, with the CFE still not ratified and troops still present in Georgia, 
Russia went a step further; it suspended its participation and further compliance with the 
treaty. It perceived the CFE as a Cold War initiative, developed to combat Russia growth 
and capability, which it was, and to Russians meant a renewed sense of militaristic 
thinking in Europe, led by the United States.274 Putin would go a step further to declare 
that neither the United States nor NATO was interested in Russia security concerns and 
that both continued to position NATO troops on Russian borders, ignoring Moscow’s 
demands that this not happen.275 Putin stated, “It is already clear that a new arms race is 
being unleashed in the world; we must not allow ourselves to be drawn into this.”276  
Arguably, Russia sees the United States as anti-Russian and therefore is not 
interested in forging a new partnership. This perception that the U.S. does not care about 
Russian security issues seems influential throughout Moscow and is negatively impacting 
any chance of improving relations with Moscow. During the twentieth-century, Russia 
found itself favorably positioned in a very bipolar world. However, since the fall of the 
Soviet Union and with its weakened military capabilities, Russia now finds it is on the 
outside looking in.  
                                                 
273 “Russian pundit sees CFE treaty ending up on the ‘scrap heap of history,” Johnson’s Russia List, 
15 July 2007, http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-155-25.cfm (accessed 12 March 2008). 
274 “Russian pundit sees CFE treaty ending up on the ‘scrap heap of history,” 
275 Chris Wilson, “Vladimir Putin attacks West for ignoring arms race concerns.” Mirror, 8 February 
2008, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/2008/02/08/vladimir-putin-attacks-west-for-ignoring-arms-
race-concerns-89520-20312890/ (accessed 9 February 2008). 
276 Wilson, “Vladimir Putin attacks West for ignoring arms race concerns.”.. 
  71
D. NATO 
The birth of formal relations between NATO and the USSR began in 1991.277 
With establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a new Russian-
NATO partnership was created with the intention of fostering a new friendship that 
would be far removed from Cold War tensions.  
In 1997, relations between Moscow and NATO seemed to be moving forward 
with great expectations. Both signed the Founding Act,278 which would offer a platform 
to discuss security issues in the Euro-Atlantic region. With the development of the 
Permanent Joint Council (JPC), Russia presumably expected greater influence in security 
decision making and cooperation with NATO. This agreement was expected to bring 
Russia and NATO closer together with the understanding that both would become strong 
strategic allies. However, since Russia was unable to let go of strong Cold War feelings 
towards NATO, the JPC never became a reality.279  
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1991 Russian joins North Atlantic Cooperation Council 
1994 Russia joins Partnership for Peace 
1996 Russian peacekeepers deploy to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
1997 Founding Act signed 
1998  Russian mission to NATO established 
1999 Russia suspends PJC over Kosovo air campaign 
2000 Putin elected, PJC relations start up again 
2001 NATO Information Office opens in Moscow 
2002 NATO opens Military Liaison Office in Moscow  
2003 NATO-Russian Council (NRC) is established 
2003 Russian troops withdraw from NATO-Balkans campaign 
2005 Russia hosts NATO multinational disaster-response exercise in Kaliningrad 
2006 First Russian frigate deploys in support of NATO-supported, Operation Active 
Endeavour 
Figure 4.   Key dates in NATO-Russian relations.280 
 
During the 1990s, it seemed that NATO and Russia would realize a strong 
partnership. But with the progression of NATO expansion, relations began to decline as 
Russia saw NATO efforts as threatening Russian security and sovereignty.281 Putin noted 
that, “if NATO expects Russia to cooperate, then it better stay away from Russian 
borders.”282 Failure to do so would lead to Russia fighting back to what it would perceive 
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The effectiveness of our cooperation will depend on the extent to which 
NATO respects the interests of the Russian Federation and the Alliance’s 
willingness to compromise on issues shaping the strategic environment in 
Europe and the world.284 
Over the past decade, the United States, NATO, and the OSCE have struggled 
with Russia in trying to find common political ground. Putin identifies these 
organizations as one and the same, ultimately led by the United States. As was the 
position in the late 1990s, Russia still is not permitted to veto internal NATO decisions, 
delay enlargement, or affect what post-Soviet countries should or should not be allowed 
admittance to NATO.285 Putin contends that he continues to abide by U.S.-led agendas, 
but receives little political benefit from the United States, NATO, or the OSCE for 
Russia’s conforming political behavior. One could argue that without cooperative 
relations with the United States, Putin is presuming that gaining international political 
support will remain a difficult goal to attain. 
Although Putin continually states that it is not beyond reason that Russia one day 
would join NATO, it is questionable whether he really believes this. But NATO is not 
solely to blame for Russian dissatisfaction. Russia’s refusal to abide by the CFE Treaty 
continues to stir discussion throughout NATO.  
Arguably NATO and the OSCE simply tolerate Russia, rather than taking it 
seriously. This could be founded on the premise that both organizations share the support 
of the United States and feel comfortable in challenging Putin with big brother in their 
corner.  In response to Russia’s publicly announced distrust of NATO and the OSCE, the 
United States has stated that Russia needs to move beyond its zero-sum-game mentality 
and realize that Russia does not have to lose if Europe, NATO, or the OSCE gains and 
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vice versa.286 The United States also made it quite clear that Russia’s unwillingness to 
support NATO expansion will not be considered a reason to stop the enlargement from 
occurring.287 
E. START II 
On January 3, 1993, the START II treaty was signed by President George H.W. 
Bush and President Boris Yeltsin. The premise behind the START II Treaty was to 
develop a method for controlling and monitoring, ICBMS and eliminating MIRVed 
(multiple-warhead) ICBMS. The United States and Russia would reduce their respective 
nuclear arsenals by two-thirds. In addition to this, phase one of the accord expected that 
the United States and Russia would reduce their total nuclear warhead count to no more 
than 4,250 warheads each.  
The accord was founded on the premise that by December 31, 2007, both the 
United States and Russia would successfully reduce their total deployed nuclear 
warheads to a number not to exceed 3,500. Again it was agreed upon that all MIRVed 
ICBMS would to be eliminated from both U.S. and Russian arsenals. The hope was that 
only single-warhead ICBMS would exist thus reducing either side’s first-strike potential 
or strategic advantage. In combination with this, all nuclear delivery devices such as the 
maneuverable re-entry vehicle (MARV) were to be eliminated and dismantled. This was 
to occur no later than December 31, 2003.  
START II also created a foundation that no more than 1,700-1,750 deployed 
warheads may be on SLBMS. There was, however, no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMS. 
Under START II, the Russians agreed that they would eliminate their SS-18 missiles. 
This would include both deployed and non-deployed assets. The idea behind this was that 
the United States wanted to eliminate the existence of all heavy MIRVed ICBMS. 
However, upon the United States and President George W. Bush withdrawing 
from the ABM Treaty on June 12, 2002 Moscow immediately withdrew from the START 
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II Treaty on June 13, 2002 just had it had long warned it would do. Russia was protesting 
U.S. withdrawal and was notably dissatisfied. Even with questionable trust on either side, 
Russia hoped that a new nuclear partnership between the United States and Russia could 
be forged. Each would be able to dedicate its own nuclear policy and program in an effort 
to protect its own sovereign ability to exist and not be attacked by other nation-states.288 
Upon the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Moscow unnecessarily became 
suspicious and questioned U.S. motives. A strong sense of anti-Americanism fell over 
Russia. Moscow was not presuming that the U.S. was attempting to tip the nuclear scale 
in its direction and thereby weakening and subordinating Russia to Washington.289 
Russia was under the impression that the United States knew of Russia’s security 
concerns and that by withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, it expressed to Moscow that 
Washington simply did not care. The United States was placing it own security concerns 
above the collective security framework that Russia had been striving to achieve.  
Russia perceives the U.S. as a playground bully attempting to force its nuclear 
will upon the international community. Russia may realize it cannot equally defend or 
compete with the U.S. in terms of nuclear capability. Morgenthau points out that the 
possibility of a nation becoming a nuclear superpower instills a sense of power, equality, 
and political credibility.290  As the United States limits Russia’s opportunity to equally 
balance its nuclear existence with the U.S., Moscow may perceive the U.S. as solidifying 
only itself as a nuclear juggernaut.  
F. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE 
While Moscow appears willing to discuss BMD with the United States, Moscow 
rejects the placement of ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar station in the Czech 
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Republic.291 Russian officials warned Poland that if they accepted a U.S. missile defense 
system, they would run the risk of both a conventional and nuclear attack by Russian.292 
While a nuclear attack by Moscow is not expected, its aggressive rhetoric suggests they 
are demanding international respect. Moscow noted that Poland is only six minutes from 
Moscow and that the missile flight pattern would force Russia to automatically respond 
to a launch by the U.S. as an attack upon Moscow.293 Washington’s plan to move 
forward with its BMD agenda is stirring difficult relations with Russia and forcing Russia 
to see the U.S. as a bully and international aggressor.  
One should consider how the United States might react if Moscow were to place 
similar missile defense system in Mexico with an explanation that it was to protect 
Moscow from South American adversaries. Interestingly, this question may be posed 
sooner than expected. July 2008 marked the rekindling of a potentially new Russo-Cuba 
nuclear relationship, which was abruptly ended in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Leonid Ivashov, head of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems, noted that since 
the United States is expanding its regional influence to Russia’s neighbors, it seems only 
logical that Russia expand its military presence abroad to include such Cold War allies as 
Cuba.294 This clearly amplifies Russia’s attempt to balance overwhelmingly unbalanced 
U.S. superiority.    
Regardless of what the United States does, Russia will presume that it will need to 
protect its borders against any potential threat, whether it is the United States or not. As 
the U.S. continues to move forward with NMD, Moscow could potentially identify U.S. 
actions as anti-Russian thereby contributing to the increased sense of Russian anti-
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Americanism. The potential result of the United States ignoring Russia’s NMD concerns 
could translates to a crippling inability to control a nuclear build-up of Russian assets.295  
Putin expressed that while the United States and Russia are clearly at odds with the 
system, he believes that the United States and Russia could enter into an understanding 
that hopefully would lead to common language on the issue.296 National Security Advisor 
Steven Hadley expressed, however, that the United States and Russia are a long way from 
coming to terms with each other position regarding NMD.297 
G. NUCLEAR CONCERNS 
Russia’s nuclear concerns are founded on the premise that the United States 
reigns as the world’s only true nuclear superpower. During the Cold War, the political 
agenda toward the USSR was to make sure it understood that if it cherished its continued 
existence, it would never consider attacking the U.S. with nuclear assets. As Cold War 
nuclear assets grew, the U.S. and Russia realized a deadlock in nuclear capability. Both 
would collectively build more than 70,000 nuclear weapons and the term “mutual assured 
destruction” (MAD) became a staple of the era.298 
What has happened since the major reductions of nuclear capability by both the 
U.S. and Russia is that the U.S. is perceived as a superior nuclear state. But Washington’s 
nuclear capability and technological advancements do nothing to prevent Russia from 
expanding and improving its own nuclear capability, nor do the terms of the 2002 
Moscow Treaty on strategic arms. Thus, Russians may perceive nuclear weapons as 
providing an opportunity to balance out international opportunity and power. Alarming 
Russia may a recent request by President George W. Bush that Congress increase 
spending on U.S. nuclear weapon’s modernization and the reliable replacement 
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warhead.299 Russia is already instinctively paranoid about current U.S. relations and how 
it is perceived by the United States after years of economic weakness, corruption, and 
political failure. It may feel that it needs to aggressively expand its own nuclear 
capability in order to keep up with the United States. Morgenthau notes that a stable 
balance of power refers to nation-states enjoying the ability to maintain the status quo in 
relative power distribution.300 It would appear that as the United States continues to make 
nuclear advancements and allocate additional funding towards the revitalization of the 
U.S. nuclear arsenal; Russia is ready to test its ability in nuclear improvements.  
The planned SS-27 is manufactured by the Moscow Institute for Thermal 
Technology. This new mobile system is reportedly to possess a MARV capability that is 
potentially designed for the purpose of defeating expected U.S. deployments of ABM 
systems. The “second strike” system appears to have U.S. officials worried as it is 
designed to counter an ABM strike.301 Washington noted that SS-27 flights were 
observed by “Cobra Ball” (an Air Force airborne intelligence RC-135 platform that 
carries infrared telescopes for tracking ballistic-missile tests at long range302) and that it 
could not comment on the new reported MARV capability.  
Russia has moved forward with resounding success in the development and 
launch of an improved Topol-M missile in May 2007. Reportedly the ICBM struck its 
target 3,400 miles down range on the Kamchatka Peninsula.303 Following the ICBM test, 
Russian news agencies reported First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov saying that 
“the ICBM, as well as a tactical cruise missile that also was tested that day, can penetrate 
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any missile defense system.”304 It appears obvious that Russia is not willing to accept 
Washington’s explanation that BMD plans are a preventative tool against possible Iranian 
attacks against the United States. 
First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov was quoted as stating, “As of today, 
Russia has new [missiles] that are capable of overcoming any existing or future missile 
defense systems. So, in terms of defense and security, Russian can look calmly to the 
country’s future.”305 This should concern U.S. policy makers. Moscow is confident that it 
has developed a missile defense system and that nothing the U.S. currently possesses is 
superior.306 Russia is clearly dissatisfied with the United States and its BMD system. 
Moscow may perceive U.S. actions as disrupting the balance of power and making it 
nearly impossible for Russia to compete with the U.S. both politically and militarily. 
Russia’s balancing hinges towards the improved development of its Topol-M capability, 
which could translate into the United States finding difficulty in defending its home 
borders just as Russia is claiming it will protect its. 
H. RUSSIA’S NAVAL CAPABILITY 
As Russia seeks to restore its international sphere of influence, and continues to 
realize greater economic stability, it appears that it is moving forward with the 
development of a stronger navy. Twenty-first century Russian forces are better trained, 
and present a greater sense of operational capability. 
Russia’s naval infrastructure has also improved, which was noticeable on 15 April 
2007, when Russia celebrated the completion of its Borei 955 strategic nuclear submarine 
complex located at Sevmash in Severodvinsk.307 What makes this historic is that the 
Borei class uses state-of-the-art submarine design, holds 16 ballistic missiles, travels at 
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25 knots submerged, and is relatively undetectable by sonar.308 This first-generation, 
post-USSR nuclear submarine will replace the Delta III, Delta IV, and Typhoon class 
submarines.309 Moscow expects each Borei-class submarine will cost approximately 890 
million dollars.310 In May 2007, the first Project 955 submarine Yuri Dolgorukiy was 
successfully launched gaining international attention.311 With the successful launch of the 
Dolgorukiy, Moscow expects four312 more Borei class to be launched by 2010, and a 
total of 20 launched by 2020.313 This would be an exceptional accomplishment that 
would solidify Russia’s capability to develop and deploy strategic nuclear submarines, 
which arguably could challenge U.S. submarine forces.314   
As it appeared Russia’s SSBN program was on track, Admiral Vladimir Masorin 
stated that Russia would also be reforming its surface naval capabilities and working 
towards building a naval force that would be second only to the United States.315 He 
went on to add that Russia would be moving away from large, carrier-type ships and 
building a great fleet of multiple use vessels capable of varying missions.316 Felgenhauer 
notes that as Russia steadily builds its forces, it will possess a surface capability that is 
“only five times smaller than the U.S. and only two times smaller than Great Britain.”317 
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While Russia’s aspirations to match U.S. naval supremacy are many years from 
becoming a reality, it is necessary to focus on Russia’s potential capability. As of July 17, 
2008, Russia deployed two surface ships to patrol the arctic waters, which included the 
Northern Fleet Seveomorsk submarine destroyer and the Marshal Ustinov missile 
cruiser.318 While Moscow claims neither of these platforms should concern the United 
States, as they are not on aggressive missions, both vessels do offer a significant array of 
armaments and forward presence. While Russia has completed a number of two month 
deployments in recent years to China, India, and Vietnam their arctic operations are not 
fully understood by Washington.  
It is possible that Russia’s attempted reemergence as a naval force could be 
related to an attempt to recreate a multipolar world in hopes of rebalancing itself with the 
United States. Morgenthau claims that as more nations come to terms with their own 
balance of power, a sense of uncertainly arises.319 Russia continues to aggressively 
compete for a greater sense of equality with the United States.320 Historically, Russia’s 
submarine and surface force has been inferior to U.S. assets. However, as Russia 
continues to enjoy strong economic gains, it is reasonable to hypothesize that Russia will 
close the Russo-American naval gap.  
Currently, Russia’s defense budget is approximately 35 billion dollars a year.321 It 
takes approximately four billion dollars to build an aircraft carrier which costs 10 million 
dollar per month to maintain.322 With these allocations in mind, Russia would need to 
spend approximately one billion dollars a year in construction alone in order to meet the  
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goal of becoming the second largest navy in the world.323This would pose a serious threat 
that would force the United States to reconsider where it deployed it forces and how it 
would potentially engage Russia abroad.  
The potential of Russian becoming a strong naval threat parallels U.S. paranoia 
during the 1980s when Soviet maritime strategy was a chief concern for Washington. 
President Reagan noted during White House speech in 1983 that a strong Navy was 
necessary for “long-needed modernization.”324 It seemed that Reagan realized that the 
United States needed to protect itself from outside aggressors which included Russia. He 
would become obsessed with building a 600-ship Navy and thereby setting a new 
standard in U.S. naval capabilities.325  
I. RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN CONFLICT 
What has yet to be determined is how much influence Putin had in the decision to 
invade Georgia. Moreover, what influence did Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili 
have in Russia’s decision to attack? By invading Georgia, Medvedev contradicted Putin’s 
claim that troops in Georgia were inactive and that the equipment was dilapidated. While 
some may debate that the equipment was antiquated, Russia successfully moved large 
military assets into Georgia very quickly. This leaves one to believe that either the 
equipment was not inoperable, or that Russia had planned this invasion for some time. 
Furthermore, it is not clear whether Russia’s claim that the Georgian’s started the conflict 
is true. It would seem illogical that such a small sovereign nation would attack such a 
superior military. But, then again, it has been argued, that each August Georgian forces  
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pressure Russian forces.326 Regardless, what is apparent is that South Ossetia, the 
northern part of Georgia, and Abkhazia have become Russia’s most recent crusades and 
will remain so for the foreseeable future.  
Figure 5 shows how Russia’s deep penetration of Georgian borders has been and 
how positioning of surface and land forces clearly states its intentions. Stationing 
warships off the cost of Abkhazia does not imply a peacekeeping mission nor does the 
destruction of Georgian ground forces in Georgia itself.  
 
Figure 5.   Map of Russia and South Ossetia. 
There are a number of theories behind Moscow’s invasion of Georgia. Some 
speculate Russia is motivated by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.327 Figure 6 show 
how this 1,000 mile pipeline makes it way from the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan, 
across Georgia, and ends in the Black Sea.328 The relevance of this pipeline is that it is 
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U.S. supported, and is owned by a number of energy companies, which include Royal 
Dutch Shell, BP, Unocal, and Chevron.329 Furthermore, the pipeline supplies oil to 
Europe and much of the world making it a major geostrategic interest.330  
 
Figure 6.   Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
 
Another theory is that since NATO and the U.S. are considering Georgia’s 
acceptance to NATO, Russia felt it necessary to show Georgia that it still could inflict its 
presence on them and that Tbilisi should avoid accepting membership.331 Russia remains 
unhappy with NATO, and may see recruitment of neighboring Russian countries as a 
continuation of its anti-Russia agenda.    
What could become an even greater problem is accomplishing Russia’s 
withdrawal from Georgia? Russia claims it will maintain peacekeeping troops in the 
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vicinity of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict zone.332 However, withdrawal may 
never be possible. Anatoly Nogovitsyn333 noted that it seems Georgia is not interested in 
peacefully resolving the conflict.334 Nogovitsyn expects that there will be a third conflict 
and that Russia needs to maintain a strong presence as peacekeepers in North Ossetia in 
the event another Russo-Georgian situation erupts.335 During a recent CNN interview 
televised in Russia, Putin blamed the United States for the Georgian crisis stating that,  
It is not just that the American side could not restrain the Georgian 
leadership from the criminal act. The American side in effect armed and 
trained the Georgian army.336 
Putin furthered his anti-American rhetoric by noting that,  
Why seek a difficult compromise solution in the peacekeeping process? It 
is easier to arm one of the sides and provoke it into killing the other side 
and the job is done. The suspicion arises that someone in the United States 
especially created this conflict with the aim of making the situation more 
tense and creating a competitive advantage for one of the candidates 
fighting for the post of U.S. president. 337 
Putin is clearly responsible for a significant amount of Russia’s twenty-first 
century anti-Americanism, but the U.S. should be careful how it scolds Moscow publicly. 
Recently, the U.S. commended China for not supporting Russia in the Georgian 
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crisis.338 This could only fuel Russia’s anti-American fire and present the premise that 
Putin and Moscow are right in calling Washington anti-Russian.   
J. CONCLUSION 
It is irrational for one to expect that the U.S. will successfully resolve all of 
Russia’s grievances and concerns over CFE, START II, and BMD or the treaties 
involving the U.S. and Russia will yield the same landmark repercussions that we 
experienced when the Cold War ended. According to Aleksei Arbatov, head the 
International Security Center at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ World Economy and 
International Relations Institute (IMEMO), the United States and Russia simply have 
different priorities.339 To be exact, the United States is more concerned with issues such 
as proliferation of nuclear weapons, and dual-use technology, and Russia is more 
concerned with preventing NATO expansion and limiting what the United States can do 
in regard to CFE and BMD.340 Moreover, Russians are concerned with the United States 
and its ability to overwhelm them militarily which includes extending superiority over 
CFE.   
At the micro level, Russia disagrees with NATO expansion and the CFE treaty 
over Moldova and Georgia. At the macro level, Russia is aggressively competing with 
the United States over militarily capabilities, missile defense, and struggling over 
international control of issues.  
It seems obvious that as George W. Bush leaves office, BMD and a number of 
security issues will fall to the next U.S. administration’s lap. Meetings in September 2007 
between Presidents Bush and Putin yielded little to be excited about and left Bush 
replying only that he was “interested” by what Putin had to say but did not expect 
anything to change in the way of the United States not placing missile defense sites in 
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Poland or the Czech Republic.341 During the meeting, Putin was noticeably disturbed, 
and it would appear that he is now trying to simply get along with the United States 
long enough to achieve what he and Moscow desire.342 While Putin expressed “a 
cautious optimism, concerning a final U.S.-Russian accord” in relation to BMD, it is 
obvious that Putin’s sentiments hold a transparent disdain for Washington’s missile 
defense policy.343  
As Moscow strives for greater strategic cooperation with the United States, it 
continues to express concern with U.S. intentions to deploy BMD sites so close to Russia. 
The United States continues to try to pacify Moscow with its argument that the missile 
sites are to protect the United States from Iran and not Russia.344 The problem is that 
Iranian missile systems cannot reach the United States, and Washington has rejected 
Russia’s offers of sites closer to Iran. This lends to a degree of validation to Russian 
concerns about the true purpose of U.S. missile defense systems. Russia perceives the 
U.S. initiative as upsetting the international balance of power and thereby threatening 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY RUSSO-AMERICAN RELATIONS 
The twenty-first century poses a plethora of political hurdles that will continue to 
plague U.S.-Russian relations well after President George W. Bush leaves office. Unlike 
the 1990s, when Russo-American relations seemed to be moving forward, current 
relations have become awkwardly unpleasant. Arguably, U.S. policy is partly be to 
blame, but logically it would appear that Russia’s misinterpretation of BMD, NATO 
expansion, and even the CFE fine print would appear to be causing most of the 
aggression coming from Russia. 
It seems obvious that years will pass before Moscow is successfully able to break 
free from its self-suppressing Cold War personality. It will not matter which political 
party takes up residency in the White House, Russia will continue to be a sore spot for 
both Democrats and Republicans. Washington should hope for a Medvedev who will 
engage in his presidential duties with greater liberalism and acceptance of the United 
States. More importantly, Washington should hope for a Medvedev who will not be 
politically controlled by Prime Minister Putin. 
The outcome of the 2008 U.S presidential elections will yield more than just a 
new leader in Washington and a fresh political start for the United States. These elections 
will determine future Russo-American relations and how successful they will be. If 
Senator Obama is elected, relations could become quite a bit better. This is based on the 
premise that Obama and Medvedev are of the same generation and potentially would not 
be infected with Cold War distrust.346 However, generational similarities alone do 
promise better relations with Moscow. That being said, since Medvedev and Obama are 
close in age, they may not view Russia or the Cold War as McCain might. If McCain is 
elected, expect to see relations with Moscow grow colder and a bit more hostile. 
Considered a significant strike to Putin is the admiration and support that Senator 
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McCain holds for Garry Kasparov,347 one of Putin’s strongest critics.348 Keep in mind, 
McCain is already calling for Russia’s removal from the G8 which also will work against 
better ties with Moscow. McCain has called for a Russo-American arms control treaty but 
continues to express subtle dislike for Putin and his Moscow cronies. This does not favor 
Medvedev or his potential attempt to smooth over Russia’s unstable twenty-first century 
partnership with the United States. Not only must this situation be addressed, it needs 
swift attention and resolution if we’re to see any chance of correcting what seems to be a 
very bad start for the twenty-first century in terms of a strong Russo-American 
partnership and a very disgruntled Moscow. 
Regardless of who our next U.S. president and vice-president are, both the 
Democrats and Republicans will inherit the task of convincing Moscow that the U.S. is 
not out to destroy them. As Russia’s joint space discovery and its ISS presence take on a 
significant role throughout the twenty-first century, Russo-American relations will 
potentially experience a greater sense of political urgency that could surpass conflicts 
over missile defense, GWOT, and NATO expansion.349 Medvedev is not Putin, and will 
most likely not share all of Putin’s political defiance towards Washington, but it is yet to 
been seen whether or not Medvedev will truly be able to lead Russia without Putin 
interjecting and molding Russian foreign policy as prime minister. 
1. Pacifying the Russian Bear 
The United States must address Russia’s insecurity that it is being subordinated to 
Washington and its policy agenda. Washington’s next president will inherent the 
daunting task of developing policies that educate Moscow with a better understanding of 
U.S. policies, its views, and Russia’s international responsibilities. Arguably, Washington 
does thoughtfully consider Russia’s foreign policy interests and security priorities, but 
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what Moscow must realize is that their internal perceptions of the world do not warrant a 
constant knee jerk reaction. With this in mind, not understanding Russia’s internal 
composition does hold grave implications to future U.S.-Russia relations. Just as 
President George W. Bush has worked with Putin, Washington must set forth a pragmatic 
policy agenda that will consider seriously Russia’s concerns and demands in an effort to 
achieve its desired goal, a stronger twenty-first century Russo-American strategic 
partnership.  
U.S. policy and its international agenda must remain its first priority for 
Washington. The next president must delicately manage Russia’s aggressive behavior 
without making them seem politically weak. Celeste A. Wallander a visiting Associate 
Professor of Foreign Affairs at Georgetown University noted that “Russia’s political 
system is essentially a modern day authoritarian regime.”350 Putin clearly strengthened 
his power and influence through the solidification of two questionable neo-Stalinist 
processes. First, he eliminated all those who opposed him politically. Second, he placed 
into power only those whom he could trust would support him unconditionally.351 One 
could argue that just as the KGB was a forceful entity under the USSR, Putin extended 
this Soviet mentality to the Russian Kremlin. Even though Putin is no longer president, it 
is questionable whether or not Medvedev will find himself ruling Russia alone or under 
the direction of an ex-KGB officer now residing as prime minister. It is doubtful that 
Putin’s aggressive persona will dissolve even though he is now technically subordinate to 
Medvedev.  
2. Jackson-Vanik Amendment 
It is necessary that the United States take the lead in bettering Russo-American 
relations in the form of rectifying and dissolving certain policy situations that should no 
longer prevent the improvement of trans-Atlantic relations with Russia. 
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The Jackson-Vanik amendment, at this point, should not hold any significance in 
Russo-American relations. Unfortunately it still does. Every year since 2001, Putin has 
lobbied the United States and the Bush administration to remove the amendment.352 But 
his efforts have fallen dramatically short of accomplishing this goal. It is for this reason 
that the United States must positively address and absolve Russian anger towards the 
amendment. In doing so, the United States would free353 Russia from the amendment and 
potentially rally better Russo-American relations. 
3. Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty 
The CFE treaty has plagued U.S.-Russian relations and has extended this political 
turmoil to NATO for years. What Washington should do is establish a forum-based set of 
meetings that would allow Russia to accurately and unequivocally express its concerns 
with the CFE Treaty. This may not fix the problem, but it would allow Russia the 
opportunity to intellectually address its concerns in a bilateral way. 
A major consideration that Washington now faces regarding the CFE is the 
Russian-Georgian conflict. Everything Putin has told the U.S. regarding troops and 
equipment in Georgia can be challenged and therefore should cause alarm for the United 
States and its decision to side with Russia on CFE ratification. If Russia has any 
expectation of resolving the CFE, they must make clear attempts to remove itself from 
Georgia and Moldova soon.   
4. World Trade Organization 
Putin has recently noted that he does believe that Russia should join the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). The reason behind not joining is that, the WTO would not 
serve Russia well or provide any substantial gain either economically or politically.354 He 
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further noted that “We do not see or feel any advantages from membership (WTO), if 
they exist at all. But we are carrying the burden.”355 
Putin has vocally attributed the WTO culture as archaic, undemocratic, and 
awkward.356 He expressed concerns that the “WTO only protects a select number of 
developed countries and is guilty of not modernizing the way it makes decisions and 
addresses economic problems.”357 To date, Russia is the only major economic country 
that is not part of the WTO.358 As the WTO continues to persuade Russia that intentions 
are good, Putin refuses to accept that allowing the WTO access to Russia’s vast energy 
sector is beneficial to Moscow.359  
Obviously, Moscow still feels it is giving everything and receiving nothing in 
return. It is questionable whether or not Moscow would turn down membership to the 
WTO if offered. But Russia cannot be relied upon to maintain a stable position on 
whether it wants in or not. For this reason, it would not be advisable for the WTO to 
accept Russia as a member. If Putin continues to play the “poor Russia” card every time 
something politically upsets him, Russian membership to either organization could 
become a headache for the international community. This along offers enough evidence 
to leave Russia on the outside looking in. 
5. Extending Space Cooperation 
The decision to formalize a U.S. partnership with Moscow regarding the ISS is 
and was a good idea, and should be further expanded in the twenty-first century. The 
points made by former U.S. official Dr. Michael Nacht in supporting Russia’s role in the 
early 1990s still hold true. As he noted: 
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Russian participation could advance U.S. goals in the former Soviet 
Union. First, it would provide hard currency for the government. Second, 
Russia is struggling to cling to the vestiges of its superpower status, and 
hardliners, in their fight against reforms, have played on the people’s fears 
of diminished international standing. Remaining active in the space 
exploration could help Russia maintain technological prestige while it 
reduces its nuclear arsenal.360  
As Russia begins to play a more significant role in the ISS in 2010, it arguably 
could become beneficial if Washington extended Moscow more opportunity to engage 
with the U.S. in space. This could create a pro-cooperation atmosphere between Moscow 
and Washington. Furthermore, it would allow the United States to better observe 
Moscow’s technological advancements without seeming as if they are being spied on. 
One problem accomplishing with will be convincing Russia that the U.S. is not 
attempting to gain access for reasons of suppressing them technologically. Indeed, Russia 
may have a great deal to offer, particularly in areas of long-duration human spaceflight 
critical to the U.S. return to the Moon.  But the U.S. will need to establish a policies that 
Russia sees as mutually beneficial, including giving Moscow a significant role in the U.S. 
space agenda.  
6. NATO Enlargement 
It has been well documented that Putin does not feel NATO has any intelligent 
role in Europe or Russia for that matter. The movement and extension of NATO troops to 
neighboring countries that border Russia will continue to be a significant problem that the 
United States will be forced to address. Russia perceives NATO as under the control of 
the United States. Any NATO initiative that is perceived by Russia as aggressive will be 
linked to U.S. policy. Russia views NATO as a Cold War organization that has limited 
relevance in twenty-first century politics. While it may be very true that NATO 
expansion achieves very little, it is necessary that if NATO continues its expansion east, 
Russia will need greater convincing that the expansion is not an effort to eventually 
invade Russia.  
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What must be considered is whether or not we want Russian as a part of NATO? 
Does Washington really want to give Putin the trust and benefits of NATO membership 
given Putin’s current erratic behavior? Anatoly Nogovitsyn noted that “Russia doctrine 
permits the right to use nuclear weapons “against the allies of countries having nuclear 
weapons if they help out in some way.”361 This clearly presents a problem. Can 
Washington trust Moscow to properly manage its first strike capabilities and not 
overreact to security issues presented by neighboring countries or the United States? 
Putin furthered Nogovitsyn’s claim and added that the use of Russian nuclear weapons 
was not out of the question if Moscow feels they were on the brink of invasion. While it 
is doubtful that Russia would ever actually use nuclear weapons, giving them the 
opportunity cannot be risked. Tony Blair mentioned prior to his exit from office that 
Russia should be allowed to sit at NATO’s table. What cannot be validated is whether or 
not Mr. Blair expressed this sentiment while he was in office. Regardless, it seems like a 
very liberal stance that offers more harm than good.  
Historically, Russia has presented itself as a hostile international contender and 
one to be dealt with. Now that Russia finds itself in a weaker international role, it is 
arguably paranoid and insecure about external invasion and internal political persuasion 
from the United States. One of Putin’s latest statements regarding NATO and its 
enlargement clearly presents that NATO and the United States has a lofty mission ahead 
of itself and pacifying Russia that both entities are more friendly towards Russia than not. 
He proclaimed:  
The effectiveness of our cooperation will depend on the extent to which 
NATO respects the interests of the Russian Federation and the Alliances 
willingness to compromise on issues shaping the strategic environment in 
Europe and the world.362  
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7. START I 
A chief concern for the U.S. will be the expiration START I in December 2009. 
The purpose of START I was to reduce the number of strategic offensive arms the United 
States and USSR had. Article II prohibits the U.S. and Russia from deploying more than 
6,000 nuclear warheads and 1,600 ICBMs, SLBMs, and associated launchers.363 In July 
2006, now Prime Minister Putin recommended a new treaty that is being referred to as 
“START+.”364 It appears that START+ will have the same fundamental structure as 
START I did, but where the problem might be found is that it is expected Russia will ask 
to remove all limitations on MIRV warheads.365 Specifically, Russia will likely look to 
increase the number of warheads on its ICBMs without interference from the United 
States. Another issue that START+ is expected to address is the verification process.366 
As it stands, the process is convoluted and very expensive. Logically, both the U.S. and 
Russia should be able to come to an agreement on this. It is clear that better allocation of 
funds making the process cheaper is of mutual interest. Moreover, better facilitation of 
inspections should not hold the process up either. But what will pose a problem is 
comprehensively reducing U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles, which will include 
reserve assets.367 Furthermore, Washington must consider that no matter what the 
outcome, it is feasible that—according to Nikolai Sokov—this will be the last “bilateral 
strategic treaty the U.S. signs with Russia.”368   
As Washington prepares for the 2008 elections, both presidential candidates need 
to keep in mind is that START I negations will not be easy. As 2008 comes to an end, 
Russia is expressing grave dissatisfaction with Washington. With the treaty expiring in 
just over a year, Washington needs to reconsider relations with Moscow and employ an 
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active policy of fixing how Russia feels about the U.S. If policy makers cannot convince 
Russia that the U.S. is not out to get them, START I Treaty follow-on negotiations could 
turn out badly. If START I is successful renegotiated, Sokov notes that it could revitalize 
failing twenty-first century relations with Moscow. Successful negotiations might provide 
a better sense of political stability between the United States and Russia. Sokov furthers 
that it could also offer a, “a stable long-term framework” that could yield a “strategic 
nuclear partnership” 
8. The Putin-Medvedev Dilemma 
As the United States enters the Medvedev era, it will become crucial that 
Washington address a number of Moscow’s concerns in an effort to present a renewed 
sense of Russo-American cooperation. While it seems logical that most of the problems 
Russia has with Washington are self-imposed, it would benefit Washington to mend 
some of the broken fences that have fallen apart already during the twenty-first century. 
If anything, Washington’s effort would represent good intentions and hopefully persuade 
Moscow that the U.S. is not anti-Russian.  
While it appeared that Putin was satisfied with current relations with Washington, 
things have slowly fallen apart with BMD and the recent Georgian crisis. During visits to 
Maine with Bush in 2007, Putin commented that he looked forward to solidifying better 
relations with Washington. However, it would appear that regardless of what Putin says, 
he has actually become disenchanted with the United States. Sarah Mendelson and Ted 
Gerber note that, Russian’s seem to see the United States as nothing more than “political 
jackals.”369 This Russian perspective of the United States may offer that Washington has 
more work ahead of itself than it realizes.  
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B. PRIME MINISTER PUTIN 
Putin as president did a good job solidifying a strong Russia figurehead within 
Moscow. He changed Russia’s economic face and revitalized its social cohesion. For the 
United States, Putin has been nothing short of a difficult and politically annoying. He has 
challenged U.S. policy, and claimed that the U.S. strongly resembles the Third Reich.370  
As Putin entered office, he is already set a very ambitious agenda for himself. 
Besides proposing tax deductions for the oil industry, and making several undeclared tax 
code changes, he believes Russia imports too much from other countries.371 He reported 
that, Russia imports 70% of its food products and that this must be reduced.372 He 
appears to feel that Russia needs become more self-sufficient and less reliant on outside 
sources. He has made it clear that he will become just as influential as prime minister, as 
he was as president. 
1. Policy Influence, Medvedev or Putin 
As Putin transitions to the prime minister position, it is still unclear how much 
control he will have over Medvedev. Putin’s strong will and aggressive political behavior 
would lead one to believe that he will continue to have some sort of influence on 
Medvedev and his role as president. It was noted than many in Russia feel that the 
transition between Putin and Medvedev was nothing more than cosmetic.373 Many 
Russians feel that it is more than possible that Putin will become a “super prime minister” 
easily controlling Russia’s security affairs, military, and foreign policy initiatives.374  
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Clearly Russia is pleased with Putin and the job he is done as prime minister. It 
seems as president, his efforts were welcomed and applauded. He successfully improved 
Russian foreign affairs, standard of living, safety, and security.375With his many 
successes, and overwhelming Russian support, Medvedev may be forced to pay more 
attention to his prime minister, than he would like.  
Figure 7 represents a poll conducted by the Yury Levada Analytical Center that 
encompassed approximately 1600 participants.376 The poll was conducted in June and 
July of 2008 and concluded that Russians believe their future is in the collective hands of 
both Putin and Medvedev. It appears Putin still holds an edge over Medvedev even as 
prime minister.377 Either way, Russian’s do not seem to have a problem with Russia’s 
current state of affairs. They’re happy with Putin, and Medvedev, leading the country, 
regardless of who holds the power.   
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Figure 7.   In Whose Hands is the Real Authority in the Russian Federation 
Placed Right Now? 
 
As Medvedev moves into office, it is necessary, as Dr. Ariel Cohen of the 
Heritage Foundation observes that Russia is given a chance to succeed without immediate 
influence from the United States. One would argue that this time is not only crucial, it is 
beneficial to both Medvedev and Putin. This will allow both Medvedev and Putin the 
opportunity to establish their respective positions and authority. Learning to work 
together in the eyes of the international community is crucial if Medvedev is expected to 
be taken seriously and as more than Putin’s puppet. 
The problem with allowing Russia an opportunity to settle into a new presidency, 
is the inability to know what will happen next. Just as the Georgian conflict caught 
everyone off guard, we may not want to give Russia to much rope, as they may end up 
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hanging the international community vice themselves. Regardless of what Washington 
hopes to see, Russian policy does waiver. Even under Medvedev, the United States needs 
to keep a watchful eye.   
2. 2012 Presidential Campaign 
It is quite possible that Putin will run for President again in 2012. He is already 
noted to reporters of the daily Kommersant that he would not rule out running and has 
plenty of time to make such a decision.378 Indeed, Putin is a strong contender to win the 
2012 elections. He was the force behind Medvedev being elected and still to this day, 
Putin is beloved in Russia. Russians perceive Putin as saving them from a failing social 
and economic system and the catalyst behind reinstating their retirement checks. This 
was a warm welcome for Russians who previously only knew poverty, sadness, and a 
drunkard in President Yeltsin. Putin gave Russians hope, his persona is strong, 
comparable to Stalin, and he is easily identified as a protector of Russian interests and 
hopes.  
As reported by the Russian News and Information Agency (NOVOSTI), the 
Kremlin’s left-wing political party has publicly made it clear that it will nominate Putin 
as its candidate for president in 2012.379 Putin is aware that Russians, for the most part, 
feel that if they are to continue enjoying improvements in their economic and social 
status, he must be their president. Arguably, Putin only stood down in an effort to remove 
the idea that he was turning Russia into a dictatorship. They only way Putin could remain 
in office was to change Russia’s constitution and he clearly stated he would not do this.  
Regardless, Putin is a strong candidate for the 2012 elections and would easily defeat 
Medvedev regardless of how well Medvedev does during his four years in office. 
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C. RUSSIA’S FUTURE WITH MEDVEDEV 
As Medvedev enters office, he will be presented with the daunting task of being 
compared to Putin, and filling his shoes. The 42-year-old, ex-Putin chief of staff has a 
background worthy of corporate America, but maybe not so for Russia’s president. He is 
successful lawyer, a democrat, and is the youngest Soviet or Russian leader to hold the 
position of president.380 What is yet to be seen is whether or not Medvedev will find 
success in the implementation of his own presidential power and policy without Putin 
interfering. It is expected that Medvedev will transfer significant power to Putin over the 
course of the next few months. When this occurs, it will present arguably a very 
challenging moment for Washington.  
It is heavily noted throughout Moscow that Medvedev is a strong liberal and 
understands that Russia is flooded with corruption and an economy overly dependent on 
natural resources.381 He is not anti-Western, he believes in a strong democratic system 
and that the state should not have significant control over private industry.382 He agrees 
that from time to time, the state does need to influence the economy, but actively 
disapproves of a government-regulated system.383 What seems most interesting about 
Medvedev’s views are that they do not completely shadow Putin’s. This would question 
why Putin supported Medvedev as his successor unless Putin knew he could control 
Medvedev and his policy agenda.  
Figure 8 shows that Medvedev’s future as Russian president continues to prosper 
and gain public support. His popularity remains steady and without much grounds for 
concern. One could argue, he is doing just what is expected of him. He is filling the 
position, listening to Putin, and addressing public opinion with a similar charismatic 
charm that Putin did. Russians like him; he is not stepping on too many toes; and his 
liberal democratic nature seems fairly welcomed by Moscow and Washington alike. With 
                                                 





Russia’s newest attempt to take over Georgia in August 2008, Medvedev has shown his 
constituency that he can be just as tough as Putin. But what has yet to be seen is whether 
or not Putin or Medvedev pulled the military strings. The war in Georgia may please 
Moscow and the Russian citizenry, it is not winning any popularity contests in 
Washington. Recently President George W. Bush noted that “Russia must respect the 
freedom of its neighbors” and accused Russia of being bullies and trying to intimidate 
weaker, less capable nations.384 He furthered his statement in that “Russian needed to get 
out of Georgia,” and that Georgia would remain a part of the international community 
and, “there is no room for debate on this matter.”385 
 
Figure 8.   Do You Approve or Disapprove of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s 
Performance? 
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Given the state of Russia when Putin took command, it is logical that he realizes 
without his leadership over the past eight years, Russia might still be entrenched in 
poverty, unbridled crime, and control by economic oligarch. Whether one likes Putin or 
not, he has been a noteworthy participant in the renaissance of Russia, even if it is only a 
weakened replica of Soviet-era strength. 
It is doubtful Medvedev will resemble Putin in many ways. Medvedev is not 
Soviet in the same way Putin is. He does not have the personal liking nor professional 
connection with either Stalin or Lenin as Putin did, and he never served in the KGB. 
What can be anticipated is that Medvedev will work diligently with the United States in 
an effort to intelligently address and improve failed Russo-American relations. The larger 
question will be whether or not Putin will give up his power.  
D. FINAL ANALYSIS 
Each of Kenneth Waltz’s three levels of analysis theorizes why Russia is 
experiencing increased twenty-first century anti-Americanism. It would appear that the 
most prominent level is the first. While Russian nationalism and its perceived balance of 
power inequality do spark controversy, neither seem to present significant evidence that 
they alone exceed the influence of level one, the individual. Putin has done an 
exceptional job of creating a delusional sense of fear in Russia that the United States is 
potentially trying to take the country over and humiliate it. This could be considered 
nothing more than a “show of sorts,” and a skillful mastering of propaganda that pins 
Russia against the United States.  
As Putin takes over as prime minister one could debate that his political strategy 
is well thought out, and his expectation is to just fade away into Russian history. 
Throughout history, Russia has always been influenced by who isin charge. Putin is not 
different in that he has created an image of himself that cannot be touched by weakening 
other political forces. He successfully spun a propaganda web that defined the United 
States as anti-Russian thereby damaging Washington’s strategic partnership with 
Moscow and bolstering twenty-first century anti-Americanism.  
  105
One might argue that Russia is looking for a sense of security, a desire for 
someone who will protect them from what they may not understand. Putin presents 
himself as being strong, determined, and wise. He poses for photo opportunities shirtless, 
flies military jets, and belligerently attacks the United States. He is what Russians were 
looking for, a confident leader who would lead them back to times of greatness, strength 
and international respect. Many contend that Russians do not think the USSR was better 
than current-day Russia, but it could be argued that they were not pleased with how 
Russia was being treated by the United States. Putin, individually, attacks Washington 
when he feels Russia is being disrespected. Regardless of what the actual truth may be, 
Russians like his demeanor. It is doubtful you’ll find a Russian who thinks Putin allows 
himself to be subordinated by Bush or his administration. As the saying goes, “it is better 
to say something, than nothing at all.” Even if what Putin is saying is wrong, he is given 
Russians hope. This will arguably become one of Washington’s biggest tasks, convincing 
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